



SOCIAL COHESION IN EASTERN AFRICA



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Kinshasa in February 2014. The meeting brought together government officials and other participants with expertise in the subject matter from around the region. A consultants' report was then written. The following people also provided comments on draft versions of the report or made other valuable contributions: Pedro Martins, Farzana Sharmin, Rosemary Bagiza, Saurabh Sina, Anne Brooks, Amal Elbeshbishi, Takyiwaa Manuh and Rodgers Mukwaya.

Executive summary

This report provides an overview of the state of social cohesion in Eastern Africa.¹ The term “social cohesion” is used to refer to a situation where a group of people interact in a way that advances the interests of all those involved. They act as a community. It is a multidimensional concept involving a number of elements, including trust, equity, beliefs, acceptance of diversity, perceptions of fairness and respect. Accordingly, this report does not purport to provide a comprehensive assessment of the state of social cohesion in Eastern Africa. Instead, using a combination of qualitative and quantitative data from a wide range of sources, the report presents a broad “social audit” of the state of social cohesion and development in the region.

The primary finding is that social cohesion in Eastern Africa has shown resilience in the face of numerous challenges since the beginning of the twenty-first century. Nearly all countries have notably improved their Human Development Index since 1990, with some countries achieving particularly rapid progress in education and health indicators. The report also shows that there has been promising improvements in poverty reduction, with Ethiopia, Uganda and Rwanda achieving the fastest progress.

Social cohesion in Eastern Africa has shown resilience in the face of numerous challenges since the beginning of the twenty-first century.

Despite this positive picture, the report highlights a number of outstanding challenges for social cohesion. An estimated 237 million people from East Africa are still living in poverty. Beyond open conflict in South Sudan and Somalia, parts

of the region are still afflicted by low-intensity conflicts and social disorder. The capacity of law and order institutions to manage such tensions is often stretched. A number of communities in the region are still faced with sporadic humanitarian crises while others remain vulnerable to natural disasters. The report also highlights both the weak performance of the labour market and rising inequality as significant threats to greater social cohesion.

While it is one of the least urbanized regions in the world, Eastern Africa is also one of the fastest urbanizing. The resulting social pressures are leading to some worrying trends.

Demographic pressures are putting a strain on scarce resources, which further tests cohesion. While it is one of the least urbanized regions in the world, Eastern Africa is also one of the fastest urbanizing. The resulting social pressures are leading to some worrying trends. For instance, levels of substance abuse are high. Alcohol abuse is nearly double the African average in five countries across the region. In six countries for which there is data, between one third and one half of all women report that they have suffered gender-based violence.

Persistent problems in the efficiency of service delivery can compound social malaise, undermining the quality of education and health provision. These inefficiencies convey a perception that governments could do more. For instance, in a recent Afrobarometer poll (Afrobarometer, 2015) (Burundi, Kenya, Madagascar, Uganda and the United Republic of Tanzania), a majority of the respondents felt that their government’s efforts to improve the living standards of the poor, create jobs and reduce inequality were insufficient.

¹ The Eastern Africa region is defined as including 14 countries: Burundi, the Comoros, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, South Sudan, Uganda and United Republic of Tanzania.

Despite these threats to social cohesion, there are many signs of resilience. Trust provides a foundation for building cohesive societies, and some countries in the region display exceptionally high levels of trust. Contrary to popular perception, our social audit also reveals notable resilience to divisions along ethnic, religious and cultural lines. For example, the United Republic of Tanzania has attempted to overcome these differences by adopting Kiswahili as a national language. Rwanda has improved service delivery through the rolling out of Imihigo – a home-grown governance arrangement based on a traditional form of performance contract.

The report concludes by observing that while there is a lot of information available pertinent to the state of social development and cohesion, much of it is currently scattered. Monitoring both qualitative and quantitative indicators more closely (perhaps through a regular regional report under the aegis of bodies such as the East African Community or the Intergovernmental Authority on Development) is recommended. The forthcoming African Social Development Index by the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), which has a particular focus on sub-national inequities, is an example of a useful tool for monitoring cohesion.

Finally, the report shows how a lack of social cohesion can rapidly endanger regional stability. Yet the focus of most regional integration programmes in Eastern Africa has been the advancement of physical and economic integration, with trade and market access being high in the priority list. Because of the trans-frontier nature of many social problems, increasingly the challenges need to be tackled at the regional level. In this context, the report argues in favour of establishing a “regional solidarity fund” to tackle social inequalities and inequities head-on.

The report argues in favour of establishing a “regional solidarity fund” to tackle social inequalities head-on.

Over the past decade and a half, Eastern Africa has emphatically demonstrated that it is capable of achieving great things in terms of improving some dimensions of social cohesion. It now needs to extend that progress to other areas to create a more cohesive and prosperous future.

Section One

Introduction

Eastern Africa is booming...

Despite a volatile and uncertain global economic environment since 2009,² Eastern Africa has been growing rapidly. With the exception of just two conflict-afflicted countries,³ the region sustained an impressive performance, sustaining an average Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth of 6.6 per cent per year between 2009 and 2014. Nine countries in the region grew at more than twice the global average over the same period.⁴

The growth of the region is not confined to the macroeconomy. A region of 367 million people (one third of Africa's population), Eastern Africa's economies are bustling with activity: cities are expanding rapidly, new sectors emerging, and innovative technology is being introduced. Nor is this dynamism confined to the economic field. In countries across the region, social indicators are improving rapidly. In short, the region has been developing at a rapid pace.

Yet this remarkable growth is not without its challenges. At the core of these challenges are the numerous emerging threats to social cohesion. In the long run, economic growth without social cohesion can be destabilizing. Easterly, and others (2006) argue that one of the primary reasons why "good" politicians, especially in low-income countries, often enact bad policies is that they experience significant social constraints on their efforts to bring about reform, and that these constraints

are largely shaped by the degree of social cohesion within the country. From this perspective, sustainable development requires the sustenance of social cohesion at community, national and regional levels.

This report examines the state of social cohesion in Eastern Africa. It does not provide an exhaustive examination of social cohesion in all its dimensions nor does it comprehensively investigate the linkages between social cohesion, and economic development. Instead, it provides a selection of data to illustrate the complex nature of social cohesion in this integrating and fast-developing region. To the extent possible, all countries in the Eastern Africa region are included in this analysis. Data limitations, however, mean that in some instances, some countries are explored in more detail than others.

This report has three sections. This first section provides the structure and scope of the report and sets out a working definition of social cohesion. The second section, divided into two parts, presents some of the achievements of the Eastern Africa region in terms of improvements in some basic social indicators. The report then proceeds to provide a social audit of the region that identifies both areas of progress and, crucially, some outstanding challenges. Together, these will provide a general picture of the state of social cohesion in Eastern Africa. Finally, the report briefly reviews some policy implications of this assessment of social cohesion.

A. Definition of social cohesion

"Social cohesion" is a complicated but useful concept for examining the resilience of a community to social, economic and environmental pressures (Dayton-Johnston, 2001; Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, 2010). The concept has its origins in the work of the French sociologist Emile Durkheim at the end of the nine-

2 The region comprises 14 countries—Burundi, the Comoros, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, South Sudan, Uganda and the United Republic of Tanzania.

3 Madagascar and South Sudan.

4 These countries were Burundi (4.5 per cent), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (7.0 per cent), Djibouti (4.8 per cent), Eritrea (5.1 per cent), Ethiopia (10.2 per cent), Kenya (5.5 per cent), Rwanda (6.3 per cent), Uganda (5.5 per cent) and the United Republic of Tanzania (6.7 per cent). The growth estimates are based on authors' calculations.

teenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century. Durkheim argued that whereas traditional societies may display quite pronounced degrees of “social solidarity” among members, the transition of a society to modernity can cause significant social dislocation, bringing about major disorder, crisis, and “anomie” (the breakdown of social bonds between an individual and the community).⁵

A “cohesive society” has been defined as one that “works towards the well-being of all its members, fights exclusion and marginalization, creates a sense of belonging, promotes trust, and offers its members the opportunity of upward mobility” (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 2011, p. 51). Put another way, social cohesion is a measure of “the extent of community that exists in a society” (Boehnke, and others, 2013, p. 12).

Moving beyond a simple definition of the concept, however, brings forward a number of competing perspectives. Kearns and Forrest (2000), for instance, argue that a society is cohesive if it has the following five attributes:

- Common values and a lively civic culture;
- Absence of social disorder and the presence of social control mechanisms;
- The presence of social strategies to reduce wealth disparities;
- Social capital, which encompasses social networks and civic participation;
- Territorial belonging and a shared identity.

This definition sets a high bar for a society to be considered cohesive. Arguably, a society that has a small level of social disorder in one area, but with a number of positive attributes in other areas, may still be generally cohesive, although it would be excluded by this definition. As will be discussed

⁵ The concept is also tied up with the narrower, more widely referenced, but also more controversial concept of “social capital” (Putnam, 1995).

in more detail shortly, social cohesion is not the absence of disagreement, but its management in a way that accommodates a plurality of views and minimizes the use of violence.

In one of the more pragmatic approaches to the subject, Easterly, Ritzan and Woolcock, (2006, p. 4–5), focusing on the extent of divisions within a society, write that, “These divisions – whether by income, ethnicity, political party, caste, language, or other demographic variables – represent vectors around which politically salient societal cleavages can (though not inevitably or ‘naturally’) develop.” This does not necessarily mean that more homogenous nations are to be considered more “resilient”, but “ones that have fewer potential and/or actual leverage points for individuals, groups, or events to expose and exacerbate social fault lines, and ones that find ways to harness the potential residing in their societal diversity (in terms of diversity of ideas, opinions, skills, etc.)”

A “cohesive society” has been defined as one that “works towards the well-being of all its members”.

There are a number of further definitions of social cohesion but⁶ it is perhaps useful to identify some of the common elements they share.

One of these elements is that social cohesion is commonly regarded as multifaceted. Attempting to understand the concept using a single or small group of variables is likely to produce misleading results. Instead, a proper assessment of the state of social cohesion requires investigation into diverse social elements and trends.

A recent international comparison of the degree of social cohesion attempts to disaggregate and define some of these elements. As figure 1 illustrates, the concept may have three main components; social relations, connectedness and a focus on the common good.

⁶ See, for example, Chan, To and Chan, 2006; and Friedkin, 2004.

The first component – social relations – can be measured by the networks that exist between individuals and groups within the society. Trust in others and acceptance of diversity are also considered important aspects of social relations. The second component – connectedness – refers to the positive ties that exist between individuals, their country and its institutions. Identification with shared values, trust and perceptions of fairness are important in this regard. Lastly, a focus on the common good is considered to be the final component of social cohesion. This can be measured by civic participation levels, the extent of solidarity and helpfulness of people in the society and the respect for rules, among other variables (figure 1). Section Two examines all these aspects of social cohesion as they apply to Eastern Africa.


The complexity introduced by recognizing the multidimensionality of social cohesion makes it tempting to focus on some of the outcomes of non-cohesion, rather than the degree of cohesion itself. For example, it is easy to “cherry pick” examples of violence in a community and use them as

evidence of lack of cohesion. It is more difficult to take a holistic view and identify subtle signs of cohesiveness or resilience to fault lines in society. This report tries to tread a middle ground; by highlighting elements of both cohesiveness and non-cohesiveness in Eastern Africa.

Stronger social cohesion is associated with better economic outcomes, more rapid social development, more resilient democratic institutions and less crime.

A further common element among definitions of social cohesion, and an observation that borders on an axiom, is that social cohesion is both a means to an end and an end in itself. Cohesive societies are desirable (Ritzen, 2000; OECD, 2011). Yet cohesive societies are also conducive to achieving other desirable outcomes. For instance, it has been shown that stronger social cohesion is associated with better economic outcomes

Figure 1: Components of social cohesion



Source: Boehnke, and others (2013, pp. 13–14).

(Casey and Owen, 2014), more rapid social development (OECD, 2011), stronger democratic institutions (Fenger, 2012) and less crime (Hirschfield and Bowers, 1997).

To the extent that social cohesion reduces the propensity for conflict, its instrumental value is enormous. Beyond the lives saved and the destruction avoided, avoiding conflict has big developmental and economic payoffs. For example, it is estimated that for every three years that a country is affected by major violence, poverty reduction lags behind by 2.7 percentage points compared with those countries not affected by violence (World Bank, 2011a).

Finally, in defining what social cohesion is, it is worth emphasizing what social cohesion is not. Social cohesion is not the complete absence of conflict or tension. A cohesive neighbourhood is one that has a collective ability to manage the shifting array of tensions and disagreements among diverse communities (Hudson, et al. 2007). In other words, there are disagreements, but they are resolved peacefully.

Cohesion is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for prosperous societies.

Achieving social cohesion is not utopia. Communities can be poor and still remain highly cohesive. Cohesion is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for prosperous societies. The following briefly discusses why and how social cohesion is relevant to policy-makers.

B. Policy interest in social cohesion

Although different terms have often been employed, the issue of how to create harmonious societies has always been a concern for Governments and heads of State. At various times, political leaders have tried to define a “social contract”

by which members of society are expected to abide. Rousseau (1762) argued that this often unwritten contract carries with it political expectations to which members of society are expected to abide.

The specific term “social cohesion” first appeared on the policy radar following the United Nations World Summit for Social Development in Copenhagen in 1995. During that Summit, Governments declared that they would put people at the centre of development. The conquest of poverty, the achievement of full employment and the fostering of social integration were placed as the overriding objectives of development. Since then, the concept of social cohesion has continued to gain the attention of policymakers for a number of reasons, including its inherent and instrumental values discussed above.

In Eastern Africa, the matter deserves some urgent attention due to a troubling paradox. On the one hand, economic performance has improved markedly since the turn of the millennium as discussed throughout this report. Yet on the other hand, opinion polls across the region suggest that many citizens feel that this economic success is not resulting in commensurate improvements in their well-being. Policies that transform economic progress into more socially inclusive development outcomes are therefore of paramount importance.

Finally, there is a gap in the literature on social cohesion, particularly as it applies to Eastern Africa. Much of the available literature is limited to post-conflict areas where social cohesion is treated as part of a broader reconstruction agenda of nation building. This report aims to fill that gap by providing evidence-based analysis and recommendations. Boehnke, and others (2013, p. 8) note that “despite the importance of this topic (social cohesion), evidence-based insights are sorely lacking.”

Section Two

An analysis of social cohesion in Eastern Africa

Emerging from the painful “lost decades” of the 1980s and 1990s, Eastern Africa has entered a new era of high economic growth rates, ambitious development strategies and renewed confidence. The region sustained an average economic growth of 6.6 per cent per year between 2009 and 2014.

The improved performance has not been restricted to the economic sphere alone but it has also registered in marked improvements in health and education outcomes across the region. This confluence of changing fortunes in both economic and social spheres presents a promising panorama for the future development

Fast growth has brought to the fore a new set of challenges, including a rapidly urbanizing population, demographic pressures, rising income inequalities and rekindled ethnic and religious tensions

of the region. Nonetheless, this period of rapid growth has brought to the fore a new set of challenges. Some of the challenges are: a rapidly urbanizing population, demographic pressures, rising income inequalities and rekindled ethnic

and religious tensions. All these factors represent potential threats to the social fabric of the region.

While some trends may be unavoidable consequences of growth, other problematic areas can be mitigated by appropriate policy responses. This report provides a “social audit” of the region, by collecting and examining data from a wide range of sources. The report focuses on both quantitative and qualitative data. It aims to highlight both trends of progress and areas of concern.

In this section, Part One introduces some of the broad-based improvements in social and economic indicators in Eastern Africa achieved since the turn of the millennium. These achievements provide a strong foundation upon which to invest in strengthening social cohesion across the region. Part one also outlines some of the policies that have already been adopted to this end.

Part Two provides a more detailed, subject by subject, analysis of the state of social cohesion. The challenges identified span across a large range of issues, at the family, local, regional and national levels. Their common element, however, is that they all impact on the current state and future prospects for a more socially cohesive society in Eastern Africa. Part Three provides a conclusion.

Part One

Progress and promise: building blocks for achieving greater social cohesion in Eastern Africa


Eastern Africa has achieved exceptional economic growth in recent years. This is a remarkable turnaround from the economic performance of the 1980s and 1990s. In that period, Eastern African countries were among a number of developing countries that recorded a zero median per capita growth rate (Easterly, 2001). This period could quite legitimately be called the “lost decades” as regard to developmental potential. During the period 2009–2014, 9 of the 14 countries in Eastern Africa achieved average annual growth rates that were higher than the average for African countries (figure 2). All but two countries (Madagascar and South

Sudan) in the region also grew faster than the world average.

Ethiopia, for instance, actually saw a decline in per capita national income in 10 of the 20 years between 1980 and 1999. Since the turn of the millennium, however, the country has turned a corner. Ethiopia has now risen to be one of the fastest-growing countries in the region and the world. Its annual GDP growth rate since 2009 has been more than five times faster than the world average.

Eastern Africa’s improved economic performance is part of a broader global trend, referred to by

Figure 2: Annual GDP growth rates (average 2009–2014)
(Percentage)



Source: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2014) and the Subregional Office for Eastern Africa (SRO-EA) calculations.

the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) as “shifting wealth”. It involves a gradual shift of the driving force of global economic growth from West to East, or from high-income countries to developing economies. The number of developing countries that recorded per capita growth rates of at least twice the OECD average increased from 12 in the 1990s to 83 in the 2000s. The trend of shifting wealth presents an ideal opportunity for developing countries to invest in social development, including taking measures to improve cohesion (OECD, 2011).

Aware of this opportunity, some countries in the region have taken explicit policy measures directed squarely at strengthening social cohesion. In 2010, for instance, Kenya established the National Cohesion and Integration Commission in response to the violence following the 2007 general elections. The mandate of the Commission is to facilitate and promote equality of opportunity, good relations, harmony and peaceful coexistence between persons of different ethnic and racial backgrounds and to advise the Government accordingly. It also addresses issues that pose threats to national cohesion, such as inequality, marginalization, insecure property rights, discrimination and poor governance. Even more recently – in June 2014 – President Uhuru Kenyatta launched the national and county cohesion and integration dialogue as a way to foster continuous dialogue for national cohesion.

Similarly, the Uganda Vision 2040, approved by the Cabinet in 2008, states that “over the Vision period, efforts will be made to inculcate the spirit of patriotism, national identity and the value for a common good” (Government of Uganda, 2013, p. 86). Such efforts include a focus on improving health and nutrition outcomes, on raising education and literacy levels and on providing care and protection for vulnerable population groups.

In the United Republic of Tanzania, Vision 2025 for Tanzania mainland and Vision 2020 for Zanzibar both emphasize the importance of cultivating social cohesion and unity. To this end, the former proposes a number of measures, including work-

ing towards an inclusive education system and ensuring that the basic needs of all people are met. Indeed, the history of the United Republic of Tanzania since its independence includes a well-documented period in which President Julius Nyerere adopted policies specifically designed to achieve greater social cohesion and national unity within one of the most ethnically diverse countries in Eastern Africa. As described in more detail by Barkan (2012), policy actions included making Kiswahili the official national language, prohibiting the use of vernacular or tribal languages on the radio, requiring that secondary school students study outside their region of origin and ensuring that civil servants were posted to regions outside their places of origin.

Although currently mired in an internal conflict since March 2015 that could ultimately undermine the achievements since the Arusha Peace Reconciliation Agreement of 2000, policymakers in Burundi have also been sensitive to the need for pursuing greater social cohesion and national unity. In its Vision 2025 blueprint, Burundi recognizes the challenge of building national unity and a nation that is secure and at peace. It seeks to “provide all stakeholders with a key role to play in achieving meaningful national reconciliation” (Government of Burundi, 2011, p. 29). Vision 2025 specifically highlights social cohesion as one of the eight pillars needed for mobilizing and engaging towards a shared best future. Developments since the elaboration of Vision 2015, particularly since the controversies surrounding constitutional change and the subsequent outbreaks of civil disorder and violence, show the importance of making sure good governance principles are adhered to.

Emerging from the chaos of the genocide against the Tutsis in 1994, Rwanda sought to create a unique national identity that would bring all citizens together and permit them to work together to achieve common goals. While its policies for rebuilding the political and social fabric of the country are clearly influenced by successful examples in other post-conflict situations, in many ways, Rwanda has forged a unique path. The Government drew on aspects of Rwandan culture

and traditional practices to enrich and adapt its development programmes to the country's needs and context. The result is a set of home-grown solutions or culturally owned practices that have been translated into sustainable development programmes.

One such example is Umuganda, which is a community service policy implemented by the Government as part of its Vision 2020. The work is organized by community members and is provided without pay. After the community work, participants meet to discuss local issues and raise concerns with community leaders. The projects completed through Umuganda include: the construction of schools, feeder roads, road repairs, terracing, reforestation, home construction for vulnerable people, erosion control, water canals, among others. The benefits of Umuganda are not just economic. The day is intended to foster community involvement and strengthen cohesion between persons of different backgrounds and levels. One such benefit is that people can access authorities to articulate their needs and voice opinions on various issues. Neighbouring Burundi has also embraced Umuganda.

At the regional level, there are also policy commitments directed towards social cohesion. The treaty establishing the East African Community (EAC), the EAC Treaty, for example, enshrines as one of its fundamental principles, "mutual trust... peaceful coexistence...good governance...equal distribution of benefits...and cooperation for mutual benefit" (article 4). These are all essential building blocks for social cohesion. The EAC Treaty also includes provisions pertaining directly to education (article 102), food security (article 110), health (article 118), culture and sports (article 119), social welfare (article 120) and women (articles 121 and 122). Within these sections, the partner States commit that they will work together to develop a common approach to addressing the needs of disadvantaged and marginalized groups (article 120 [c]).

Having set these high-level commitments, EAC adopted the Development Strategy 2010/11–2015/16 at the twenty-third Meeting of the Council

of Ministers, held in Arusha in September 2011. Within this development strategy, there are a number of strategic interventions relating to social cohesion, including mainstreaming gender, youth issues and social protection into EAC policies, programmes and projects. Subsequently adopted and consistent with the development strategy, the EAC Strategic Plan for gender, youth, children, persons with disability, social protection and community development (2012–2016) (EAC, 2012) sets out interventions in the six areas of its title.

Of course, it is one thing to make commitments on paper and another thing to take specific steps to achieve social cohesion. As the social audit of this report suggests, there is considerable evidence to suggest that, despite setbacks such as those currently facing Burundi, social cohesion is generally being strengthened across the region. In particular, there has been promising progress in the region's pursuit of human development, which is an essential building block for creating more cohesive societies.⁷

Measuring the progress of a multidimensional phenomenon like social cohesion is not a straightforward matter. While there is no single indicator that can capture development in all its facets, the new composite indicator by ECA, the African Social Development Index, seeks to measure the extent to which individuals suffer social exclusion throughout their lifetime. It is a tool that captures the essence of social challenges and is built on the premise that social development should be reflected in improved human conditions, both at the national and subnational levels (ECA, 2014). Work is currently ongoing in conjunction with national statistical agencies to elaborate national and subnational the African Social Development Indices across the Eastern African region.

Another more established composite index with a significant bearing on debates about social cohesion is the Human Development Index (HDI) by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), which has been one of the most widely accepted indexes of its kind since its inception

⁷ See, for example, AllAfrica.com, 2014; and Jenson, 2010.

Table 1: Human Development Index rankings

Country	2000 (/157)	2010 (/187)	2013 (/187)
Seychelles	49	64	71
Kenya	123	148	147
Rwanda	149	168	151
Madagascar	125	151	155
Comoros	-	157	160
Uganda	140	160	164
United Rep. of Tanzania	145	163	159
Djibouti	-	170	170
Ethiopia	156	173	173
Burundi	154	178	180
Eritrea	-	181	182
Dem. Rep. of the Congo	157	187	186

Source: UNDP (2014a).

Note: Not measured – Somalia and South Sudan.

in 1990. HDI collates proxies of health, education and the capacity to attain a decent standard of living. Although still ranking lowly on a global scale, nearly all countries in the region have improved their HDI since 1990, with some countries achieving particularly rapid progress (figure 3). For example, Rwanda, a country that was once ranked at the bottom of HDI, now has the sixth-highest level of development in the region. Rapid progress is also apparent in the index of Ethiopia, Uganda and the United Republic of Tanzania.


All countries [in the subregion], except the Seychelles, remain in the bottom half of the global rankings of the HDI.

It is worth noting, however, that this rapid growth is occurring from a low base. All countries except the Seychelles, remain in the bottom half of the global rankings of the HDI (table 1). Four countries – Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti and Ethiopia – are still in the bottom 10 per cent.

Nonetheless, as a relatively simple composite indicator, the HDI can mask improvements in individual indicators of great relevance to social cohesion, such as education enrolments or improvements at the subnational level in the provision of health facilities. As the forthcoming African Social Development Index will reveal, some of these indicators have shown marked progress.

Primary school enrolments are one such indicator. As illustrated in table 2, net primary school enrolments have increased significantly in nearly all countries in the region. Four countries – Burundi, Djibouti, Ethiopia and the United Republic of Tanzania – have more than doubled their education enrolment rates since the early 2000s. These achievements reflect the fact that educational systems are becoming more inclusive. Education systems that are inclusive tend to facilitate social mobility, reduce the likelihood that generations are left behind and enable greater civic participation in governance (OECD, 2011). According to Gradstein and Justman (1999), education promotes stronger social cohesion by facilitating a common culture and building human capital. In addition, increasing education rates are associated with increases in productivity, reduction in

Figure 3: Human Development Index



Source: UNDP (2014a).
 Note: Excluding Somalia

crime and improved quality of life (Department for International Development, 2012). Ultimately, attaining higher levels of education at national level can also result in higher levels of long-term, sustainable economic growth (Chang, 2010, p. 181). In short, inclusive education contributes significantly to creating more cohesive societies.


Of course, the quality of educational provision cannot be ignored. Disparities between quality and quantity can greatly undermine education outcomes. Nonetheless, the significant gains made in net enrolment rates does at least reflect the high priority given to education by government authorities across the subregion. Another indicator of this is the fact that most Governments in the region have significantly increased

Most governments in the region have significantly increased expenditure allocations on education since the early 1990s.

expenditure allocations on education since the early 1990s.⁸ As one example, Burundi tripled its expenditure on education as a percentage of GDP between 2000 and 2011 (ECA SRO-EA, 2013).

⁸ In general, the priority has been on primary education. For instance, primary education expenditure constitutes more than 50 per cent of total education spending in five countries in the region (the Comoros, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda and the United Republic of Tanzania) (ECA SRO-EA, 2013).

Table 2: Net primary school enrolment rates




Source: United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (2014).
 Note: Not measured – Eritrea, Somalia and South Sudan.

This prioritization has been matched by OECD⁹ donors. Members of the OECD Development Assistance Committee more than doubled their

combined official development assistance contribution to education in the region, from less than \$500 million in 2002 to more than \$1 billion in 2010 (ECA SRO-EA, 2013).

9 OECD, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.

Table 3: Under-five mortality rates (per 1,000 live births)



Source: Country data (Child Mortality Estimates Info, 2014).

Besides education, another social indicator that has exhibited remarkable improvement in the past 20 years is the under-five mortality rate. This rate measures the probability of dying between births and attaining 5 years of age; expressed per 1,000 live births. Nearly all countries have reduced the number of deaths of children under the age of five (table 3). Eight countries – Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Rwanda, Seychelles, Uganda and the United Republic of Tanzania – have seen their rates drop by 50 per cent or greater since measurement began. Importantly, this progress has generally been achieved across all quintiles of income, a vital characteristic of inclusive development (Society for International Development, 2013).

The fastest progress in reduction of child mortality rates has been observed in Ethiopia, Rwanda and the United Republic of Tanzania. In other countries, progress is patchy, but clearly in the right direction. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, for instance, the under-five mortality rate fell by 7.5 per cent between 2000 and 2011, after being static during the 1990s. While the rate of child mortality still remains unacceptably high (position 168 in 2011 and the fifth worst-ranked

country in the world), it represents progress within a population that has borne the brunt of years of conflict and instability (UNICEF, 2014). In the Comoros, spending on education as a percentage of GDP almost doubled between 2002 and 2008 (ECA SRO-EA, 2014). Commitments like these from Governments bode well for the prospects of social cohesion.

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In summary, over the past 15 years, Eastern Africa has achieved marked improvement in a number of social and economic indicators, presenting a promising opportunity to create a stronger degree of social cohesion throughout the region. The next section evaluates the extent to which this opportunity is being taken across a number of specific areas.

Part Two

Social audit of the state of cohesion in Eastern Africa

This section examines a number of dimensions of social cohesion in Eastern Africa. They are:

- Poverty
- Conflict, law and order
- Humanitarian need and vulnerability to natural disasters
- Inequality
- Trust
- Labour markets
- Migration
- Ethnic, religious and cultural differences
- Demographic pressures
- Substance abuse
- Governance and service delivery

While each of these dimensions is discussed in turn, it is worth noting that they are closely interrelated. Changes in one dimension will often cause changes in others. For example, conflicts tend to perpetuate poverty, generate higher levels of migration and undermine governance and service delivery. Similarly, well-functioning labour markets are often associated with reduced poverty and inequality. Where possible, the connections between each of these dimensions are identified and explored.

This section is not intended to provide an exhaustive analysis of all dimensions of social cohesion in Eastern Africa. It is questionable whether such a task is possible given the multiple and complex factors that impinge on social cohesion. As a result, this social audit is, by necessity, selective; focusing on areas considered most relevant to the agenda of building more harmonious and cohesive societies in the region.

A. Poverty

Poverty is one of the most blatant and unjust forms of social exclusion. As stressed by OECD (2011), a cohesive society is one that addresses the needs of all its members. A society is not doing this if its members are deprived of the ability to meet their basic needs. This means that poverty and the pursuit of its eradication are highly relevant to the social cohesion agenda. Adopting this rationale, Jenson (2010) uses measures of poverty as an indicator of social cohesion failures.

In Eastern Africa, an evaluation of the progress made in eradicating poverty depends upon the yardstick of measurement employed. One of the most commonly used yardsticks is the World Bank's income-based poverty measure. This involves setting an international poverty line (currently at \$1.25 per day) and then counting the number of people who live below that line.

Ethiopia and Uganda have demonstrated the most consistent and pronounced declines in poverty since the 1980s.

Using this measure, Ethiopia and Uganda have demonstrated the most consistent and pronounced decline in poverty rates since the 1980s, while increases have been registered in Kenya and Seychelles (table 4). Unfortunately, the lack of data does not allow for temporal comparisons of trends for all countries in the region. What is clear, however, is that according to this measure, poverty persists in many countries, despite the improved economic fortunes discussed above. Using the available data, ECA SRO-EA (2013) notes that although \$1.25-a-day poverty has been reduced in relative terms in the region (from 65 per cent in 2000 to 54 per cent in

2011), the absolute number of citizens living below the international poverty line has actually increased, from 155 million to 166 million over the same period.

Nonetheless, there are a number of well-publicized limitations to using this measure of poverty. This is because the poverty estimates are very sensitive to the calculation of purchasing power parities. When these were recently revised, the number of people estimated to be living in extreme poverty worldwide fell overnight by between 300 and 600 million.¹⁰ Within Eastern African, Kenya experienced the biggest overnight change with a reduction in its poverty headcount by about 6 million (from 16.2 million to 10.4 million) (Chandy and Kharas, 2014).

Such significant revisions in statistics, without any change in actual poverty levels, mean that the

measure must be treated with some circumspection. Deaton (2001) also points out that it is very difficult to calculate purchasing power parities (which underlie the \$1.25-a-day poverty estimates) in a way that fully accounts for different consumption patterns across countries.

An alternative approach of measuring poverty is to use a poverty line set by the national authorities of each country. In other words, the relevant government authority identifies a given amount of income that a household must have if it is not to be considered poor. This line could then be used to calculate the national poverty headcount.

This method paints a slightly more optimistic picture. Using this approach, three of the four countries that have multiple observations over time – Ethiopia, Rwanda and Uganda – have

Table 4: Poverty headcount using an international poverty line

(Percentage of the population living below \$1.25 per day using 2005 purchasing power parities)

	1980s	1990s		2000s		2010s		
Burundi		84.25 1992	86.14 1998	81.32 2006				
Comoros				46.11 2004				
D. Rep. Congo				87.72 2005				
Ethiopia	66.22 1981	63.2 1995	54.57 1999	38.96 2005		36.79 2010		
Kenya		38.42 1992	28.5 1994	31.83 1997	43.37 2005			
Madagascar	85.89 1980	67.07 1993	72.04 1997	82.37 1999	76.34 2001	82.43 2005	87.67 2010	
Rwanda	63.26 1984				79.37 2000	71.97 2005	63.02 2010	
Seychelles			0 1999		0.25 2006			
Uganda	70.8 1989	71.92 1992	63.01 1996	59.43 1999	56.57 2002	51.72 2005	37.91 2009	37.78 2012
United Rep. of Tanzania		71.98 1991			84.23 2000		67.87 2007	43.48 2011

Source: World Bank PovCal (2014).

¹⁰ To calculate purchasing power parities, the International Comparison Program measures prices in nearly 200 countries. In 2014, it updated its estimates from a 2005 base year to a 2011 base year. When it did so, the number of people considered to be living in extreme poverty automatically fell from 1.2 billion to 900 million or 600 million (Chandy and Kharas, 2014).

demonstrated a reduction in poverty (table 5). The exception is Madagascar, which has seen a slight increase. All other countries have only one observation - these national estimates of poverty tend to be lower than the international poverty line estimates, as discussed later and highlighted in table 8.

Nonetheless, using national data to measure poverty is not free from limitations either.¹¹ First, the use of a nationally determined poverty line means that comparisons regarding the level of poverty across countries are no longer feasible. There is thus no longer an objective way to measure whether poverty is more prevalent, for instance, in Uganda or Ethiopia. Second, this measure and the World Bank's measure are confined to measuring income-based deprivation only. Yet it is commonly agreed that a lack of income is only

one aspect of poverty.¹² Other aspects of poverty include lack of access to healthcare, education and clean water. The Oxford Poverty and Human Development's multidimensional poverty index (MPI) that is published by UNDP¹³ seeks to capture these additional aspects by treating poverty as a multidimensional variable. It incorporates three dimensions of poverty – health, education and living standards – and uses ten indicators to measure these dimensions and estimate poverty numbers (Alkire, and others (2015), give a detailed explanation of multidimensional poverty).

According to MPI, high levels of poverty remain in Eastern Africa with 237 million people living in multidimensional poverty.¹⁴ Seven countries have more than half of their populations living in poverty. Three countries – Burundi, Ethiopia and Somalia – have more than 80 per cent of their

Table 5: Poverty headcounts using national data and poverty lines

	1990s			2000s			2010s	
Burundi				66.9 2006				
Comoros				44.8 2004				
Dem. Rep. of the Congo				71.3 2005				
Eritrea	69 1993							
Ethiopia	45.5 1995	44.2 1999		38.9 2004			29.6 2011	
Kenya				45.9 2005				
Madagascar				70.9 2001	75 2005		75.3 2010	
Rwanda				56.7 2006			44.9 2011	39.1 2014
Seychelles				13.4 2006				
South Sudan						50.6 2009		
Uganda	56.4 1992	44.4 1996	33.8 2000	38.8 2002	31.1 2005	24.5 2009		
United. Rep. of Tanzania							28.2 2012	

Source: National authorities of each country.

11 For a discussion on some of these problems, see Deaton (2001), for example.

12 A detailed examination of this issue is provided by Kakwani and Silber (2008); and Sen (2001).

13 UNDP, United Nations Development Programme.

14 This estimate does not include the Comoros, Eritrea, Seychelles and South Sudan, for which data is not available.

Table 6: Multidimensional poverty

(Percentage of population living in multidimensional poverty and number of people living in multidimensional poverty)

	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011
Burundi	87.9 6 833 000					81.8 7 553 000	
Dem. Rep. of the Congo						74.4 46 278 000	
Djibouti		26.9 212 000					
Ethiopia							88.2 78 887 000
Kenya				48.2 19 190 000			
Madagascar				77 15 774 000			
Rwanda	86.5 8 155 000					70.8 7 669 000	
Somalia		81.8 7 104 000					
Uganda		74.5 22 131					70.3 24 712 000
United Rep. of Tanzania						66.4 29 842 000	

Source: UNDP (2014a).

populations living in poverty (table 6). In general, MPI estimates of poverty are higher than income-based measures (table 8). There are also fewer observations over time of MPI. In particular, there are only three countries in the region – Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda – with multiple observations since measurement began. In each of these countries, poverty as a proportion of the population has decreased. However, Rwanda is the only country for which the absolute number of poor people has also decreased.

Lastly, one aspect of poverty that is missing from all three measures described above is the self-reported perception of feeling that one is living in poverty. As argued by Ravallion (2013, p. 1) “the idea of a ‘social subjective poverty line’ (below which people tend to think they are poor, but above which they do not) is arguably the most conceptually appealing way of defining poverty”. This is a relatively under-exploited aspect of poverty analysis.

Table 7 provides a summary of the most recent Afrobarometer results, which show that in each of the five Eastern African countries recently surveyed,

the majority described their present living conditions as fairly bad or very bad. In Kenya, Uganda, and the United Republic of Tanzania, approximately two thirds of those interviewed fell in this category, and less than 10 per cent of the population in the United Republic of Tanzania described their living conditions as fairly good or very good.

There is a significant difference between official measures of poverty and people’s perceptions of whether they are living in poverty or not.

A combination of all four measures of poverty – use of the national poverty line, international poverty line, multidimensional poverty and satisfaction with living conditions – reveals that, in some instances, there is a significant difference between official measures of poverty and people’s perceptions of whether they are living in poverty or not (figure 4). In Kenya, Uganda and the United Republic of Tanzania, for example, a much higher proportion of people report that their living con-


Table 7: Perceptions of living conditions

“In general, how would you describe your own present living conditions?”
(percentage of respondents who replied)

Country	Very/fairly good	Neither good nor bad	Very/fairly bad	Don't know
Burundi	25	22	54	0
Kenya	14	14	71	0
Madagascar	10	34	55	0
Uganda	28	10	62	0
United Rep. of Tanzania	8	27	65	0

Source: Afrobarometer (2015).

Figure 4: Measures of poverty (percentage)



Source: Afrobarometer (2015), World Bank PovCal (2014), and UNDP (2014a).

Note: Measures of poverty using the national poverty line, the international poverty line and the multidimensional poverty index are from different time periods. Specifically, data for Burundi is from 2006, 2006 and 2010 respectively; for Kenya – 2005, 2005 and 2008–2009 respectively; for Madagascar – 2010, 2010 and 2008–2009 respectively; the United Republic of Tanzania – 2012, 2007 and 2010 respectively; and for Uganda – 2009, 2009 and 2011 respectively.

ditions are bad than the proportion of people reported to be living in poverty by the government. These differences demand further research and improved monitoring.

A key message that emerges from this analysis is that poverty remains stubbornly high in many parts of Eastern Africa. The extent of that poverty and its trajectory may differ depending on its yardstick of measurement, but the message remains. The prior-

The prioritization of poverty eradication should continue to be an important and urgent policy objective in the social cohesion agenda.

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Table 8: Poverty headcount (Percentage of the population)

	National poverty head- counts (year)	World Bank poverty head- counts - \$1.25 per day using 2005 PPP	Multidimensional poverty
Burundi	67 2006	81 2006	88 2010
Comoros	45 2004	46 2004	
Dem. Rep. of the Congo	71 2005	88 2005	74 2010
Djibouti			27 2006
Eritrea	69 1993		-
Ethiopia	30 2011	31 2010	88 2011
Kenya	46 2005	43 2005	48 2008/09
Madagascar	75 2010	81 2010	77 2008/09
Rwanda	39 2014	63 2010	71 2010
Seychelles	13 2006	0.25 2006	
Somalia			82 2006
South Sudan	51 2009		
Uganda	25 2009	38 2009	70 2011
United Rep. of Tanzania	28 2012	68 2007	66 2010

Source: National authorities of each country.

B. Conflict, law and order

Social cohesion does not imply the total absence of tension or conflict. As discussed in Section One, tension occurs in all groups of people, regardless of their genetic disposition, ethnic fractionalization or other characteristics (North, Wallis and Weingast, 2012). Instead, the concept of social cohesion captures the situation in which a society has the collective ability to manage the shifting array of tensions and disagreements among diverse communities (Hudson, and others, 2007). It is when conflicting interests are resolved without the use of violence that social cohesion is exhibited. Institutions in society that promote law and order, such as the judiciary and the police force, play an important role in this respect.

At the same time, the economic environment also plays a crucial role. Low rates of economic devel-

A cohesive society manages to accommodate conflicting interests among its people in such a way that they avoid the use of violence.

opment and negative shocks to income tend to increase the propensity for internal conflict (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004). A 5 per cent reduction in economic activity is associated with a 50 per cent increase in the likelihood of internal conflict the following year, according to research by Miguel, Satyanath and Sergenti (2004). Moreover, once conflict has occurred in a country, it is more likely to recur. On average, there is a 39 per cent risk that conflict will resume in the first five years of a post-conflict environment. This falls to 32 per cent in the following five years (Collier, 2006).

Persistent insecurity also restricts social development. It is estimated that for every three years that a country is affected by major violence, poverty reduction lags behind by 2.7 percentage points compared with those countries not affected by violence (World Bank, 2011a). This is serious given the fact that 3 of the 5 most fragile states in the world are in Eastern Africa, according to the 2014 Fragile States Index produced by the Fund for Peace. At the same time, persistent, low-intensity conflict is also exerting stress in a number of “hot-spots” across the region (for example, in Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo).

In the past, Eastern Africa’s collective ability to manage disagreements without the use of violence has fallen short on multiple occasions. The decade of the 1990s was a particularly turbulent time for the region, in which strife in the Great Lakes Region and in the Horn of Africa affected all countries in some way or another. The chaos that followed the removal of Said Barre in Somalia (1991), the collapse of the Derg communist regime in Ethiopia (1991), the Rwandan Genocide (1994) and the toppling of President Mobutu in the former Zaire (1997) all occurred during this decade and caused considerable social dislocation and suffering.

The uncertainty caused by these conflicts persisted into the twenty-first century. For example, the International Rescue Committee estimates that between 1998 and 2008 about 5.4 million people died from preventable diseases and starvation aggravated by conflict in the Great Lakes Region.¹⁵ In fact, there has been a trend of rising conflict in the region since 2004 according to the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (figure 5).

In response to these challenges, a number of measures have been taken by Eastern African countries and their allies. Indeed, some of these measures have been well recognized as being highly effective. The African Union’s Mission in Somalia (Amisom), for example, has been described as being “an incredible success story

... for very little money”, by an adviser referenced in Mills (2013). Amisom has managed to achieve what no other international force has been able to achieve in Somalia, gradually pushing Al Shabaab out of Mogadishu and most urban centres. Al Shabaab lost control of 10 population centres in March and April 2014, which is expected to reduce its revenue and training bases (Kelley, 2014a). In Mogadishu, the government controls about 90 per cent of the city, according to a Somali official (Kagire, 2014).


A relatively new phenomenon for the region has been the increase in terrorism since the late 1990s.

However, the forms of violence that conflict entails are ever-changing, as suggested in the World Bank’s “World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security and Development”. For instance, a relatively new phenomenon for the region has been the marked increase in terrorism since the late 1990s. In August 1998, the United States Embassies in Kenya and the United Republic of Tanzania were simultaneously attacked by Al Qaeda affiliates resulting in more than 200 deaths and thousands of non-fatal injuries. Since then, Al Shabaab has been responsible for a number of terrorist attacks in the region, including a 2010 attack in Kampala, the 2013 attack on Westgate shopping mall in Nairobi in which 67 people died, countless bombings and assassinations in Somalia and a suicide attack at a cafe in Djibouti in 2014. In fact, 2014 saw an increase in the number of Al Shabaab attacks outside Somalia’s borders, including an attack in Northern Kenya in November 2014 in which there were 28 fatalities, including 24 teachers. The Garissa attack on university students in April 2015 shows that these attacks are unfortunately not abating.

To tackle this new form of violence, a number of States have taken pre-emptive measures aimed at improving oversight and regulation of organizations. In Kenya, for example, the Government

¹⁵ Based on estimates provided by the International Rescue Committee and detailed in McGreal (2008).

Figure 5: Fatalities from armed conflict



Source: Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (2013) - Version 4

deregistered 510 non-governmental organizations in December 2014 as part of its efforts to crack down on the use of those organizations as vehicles for criminal activities and to block the financing of terrorism. The government also froze the bank accounts of the deregistered organizations and revoked the work permits of their foreign employees (BBC, 2014). While strong measures may be necessary to guard against future terrorist attacks, they must be managed carefully to ensure that they do not generate mistrust of official institutions.

When placed in a global context, the persistent signs of insecurity are significant. The 2014 Fragile States Index¹⁶ places three countries from Eastern Africa – the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Somalia and South Sudan – within the five most fragile States in the world and in the category of “very high alert”. The remaining countries all fall into the categories of “alert”, “very high warning” or “warning” (table 9).

These signs of fragility will be tested over the coming years as a number of countries hold elections. In Burundi, for example, worrying developments took place in the build-up to the 2015 elections, including allegations of the building up of weapon stocks, violence against political opponents and restrictions on the media (Chemouni, 2014). The subsequent failure of a coup d'état in May 2015 did not ultimately resolve the dispute. Similar concerns have also been raised about the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Julien, 2015).

Another major manifestation of conflict within a society is criminal activity. Here, most of the evidence has been based on studies of high-income countries. For example, Hirschfield and Bowers (1997) find that disadvantaged areas in the United Kingdom experience lower levels of crime if, all things equal, they have stronger social cohesion. Similar results were also found in a Chicago study (Sampson, Raudenbush and Earls, 1997).

¹⁶ The Fragile States Index uses 12 primary indicators that span across social, economic and political dimensions. For more information about the Index and its methodology is available from <http://ffp.statesindex.org/>. Last viewed 14 November 2014.

Table 9: Fragile States Index 2014
(Rank out of 178 countries)

Very high alert	
1	South Sudan
2	Somalia
4	Dem. Rep. of the Congo
Alert	
18	Kenya
19	Ethiopia
21	Burundi
22	Uganda
23	Eritrea
34	Rwanda
Very high warning	
45	Djibouti
54	Comoros
59	Madagascar
65	United Rep. of Tanzania
Warning	
122	Seychelles

Source: *The Fund for Peace (2014).*

In Eastern Africa, homicide rates measured in 2008 were highest in Uganda at a rate of 36.3 homicides per 100,000 people (table 10). Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya and the United Republic of Tanzania all have rates between 20 and 26. Somalia had the lowest homicide rates at 1.5 per 100,000 (UNdata, 2014).

Placed on a global perspective, the rates in Eastern African countries are relatively high. The median rate of all countries in the world that were measured in 2008 was 6 homicides per 100,000 population. This is lower than all countries in the region, except Somalia and Djibouti.

Consistent with these figures are the incarceration rates in Eastern Africa. While the relationship between rates of criminal activity and rates of incarceration is highly debated,¹⁷ high incarceration rates suggest, at the very least, that officially

¹⁷ See, for example, Conklin (2003); and Marvell and Moody (1996).

Table 10: Homicides in 2008

Country (sorted by ascending rate)	Count (number of homicides)	Rate (homicides per 100,000 population)
Somalia	138	1.5
Djibouti	29	3.4
Madagascar	1 588	8.1
Seychelles	7	8.3
Comoros	85	12.2
Rwanda	1 708	17.1
Eritrea	879	17.8
Kenya	7 733	20.1
Burundi	1 726	21.7
Dem. Rep. of the Congo	13 558	21.7
United Rep. of Tanzania	10 357	24.5
Ethiopia	20 239	25.5
Uganda	11 373	36.3

Source: UNdata (2014).

recorded and punished criminal activity is high. In this respect, Ethiopia has the largest prison population – significantly larger than any other country in the region (figure 6).

When measured on a per capita basis, however, the picture changes markedly; with Seychelles displaying the largest prison population, with 868 prisoners per 100,000 population.¹⁸ This is, in fact, the highest rate in the world, slightly above that of the United States of America. At the other end of the spectrum, the Comoros has the lowest prison population in absolute and per capita terms (International Centre for Prison studies, 2014).

If criminal activity is symptomatic of weak social cohesion, one of its causes is likely to be institutions for law and order that are incapable of adequately addressing tension. The 2014 Mo Ibrahim Index of African Governance, for instance, found that only one country from the region – Seychelles – was in the top five African countries for measures of safety and rule of law (table 11). The next closest countries were Rwanda at seventh and the United Republic of Tanzania at twentieth positions. More

¹⁸ Note that the total population of Seychelles is less than 100,000. So this is an extrapolation.


worryingly, four countries were in the bottom 20 per cent of all countries in Africa. These were Burundi, Eritrea, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Somalia. This composite index has received some criticism, including specific concerns directed at the measures of safety and rule of law.¹⁹ Nonetheless, the indicator does suggest that there is room for improvement in the region's collective ability to resolve disagreements without the use of violence.

In the face of these challenges, there are a number of examples of innovations from the region that hold promise for strengthening the effectiveness of law and order institutional arrangements. In Rwanda, for instance, the Abunzi system was developed (a system of committees of people that act as community mediators). In traditional society, Abunzi were men known within their communities for their personal integrity and were asked to intervene in the event of a conflict. These traditional mediators were institutionalized in 2006 in order to help mediate minor civil and criminal cases, especially those involving land disputes and to increase social cohesion and stability. This form of mediation is now mandatory before filing a case in court and this helps to effectively and efficiently settle disputes.

In summary, Eastern Africa continues to face a number of challenges to its peace and security. However, these challenges can be tackled through a number of local approaches and organizations that have demonstrated having a powerful potential for peace. Identifying these successful approaches, investing in them and leveraging them holds the most promise for creating a more peaceful and cohesive region.

¹⁹ Indicator contains mismatches of data. According to a researcher, "We have been engaging the Mo Ibrahim Foundation on the mismatch of their data. Some have been corrected and others not. Their argument is that they are not data providers. And, our argument is that if their data provider is consistently providing wrong data, they need to question the reliability of their data provider." (Karuhanga, 2014).

Figure 6: Prison population (June 2010 – June 2014) total (LHS) per 100,000 population (RHS)



Source: International Centre for Prison studies (2014).

Table 11: Safety and the rule of law index (From the 2014 Ibrahim Index of African Governance)

Rank / 52	Country	Score / 100
	Africa	51.7
1	Botswana	85.3
5	Seychelles	70.8
17	Rwanda	58.2
20	United Rep. of Tanzania	57.4
21	Comoros	56.6
25	Uganda	53.3
27	Kenya	51.3
29	Djibouti	50.6
31	Ethiopia	50.0
32	Madagascar	49.0
43	Burundi	40.4
48	Eritrea	31.0
50	Dem. Rep. of the Congo	23.7
52	Somalia	5.9

Source: Mo Ibrahim Foundation (2014).

C. Humanitarian need and vulnerability to natural disasters

The damage caused by natural disasters and ongoing vulnerability to future disasters are inherently tied up with the process of development. UNDP²⁰ (2004, p. 9) states that:

It has been clearly demonstrated how disaster risk accumulates historically through inappropriate development interventions. Every health centre or school that collapses after an earthquake and every road or bridge that is washed away in a flood began as a development activity. Urbanization and the concentration of people in hazard-prone areas and unsafe buildings, increases in poverty rates that reduce the human capacity to absorb and recover from the impact of a hazard, and environmental degradation that magnifies hazards such as floods and droughts, are only a few examples of how development can lead to disaster risks.

20 UNDP, United Nations Development Programme.

Whether at global, regional or national levels, having a segment of the population facing acute humanitarian need represents a threat to cohesiveness in the same way as having a segment of the population in poverty does.

Hunger and food insecurity are both a cause and consequence of social cohesion failures in Eastern Africa. In Kenya, for instance, food price fluctuations led to a number of protests and demonstrations in 2011 and concerns remain about the country's future food security (Institute of Development Studies, 2014). Riots over food prices also occurred in Uganda in the same year (Kron, 2011). Droughts in Ethiopia in 2008 affected all regions in the country except the Western region. This regional difference was due, at least in part, to lack of infrastructure and integrated commodity markets at the national level, according to OECD²¹ (2011). In other words, weaknesses in the level of national cohesion compounded the effects of the famine.

Unfortunately, unmet humanitarian needs in the region are not a new phenomenon. The lack of protection for civilian populations in Burundi and Rwanda during the 1990s culminated in the Rwandan genocide in 1994, in which an estimated 800,000 people died. This then morphed into a fresh humanitarian crisis among the displaced populations along the border of Rwanda, particularly in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Devastating humanitarian crises have also occurred in the region more recently. By 2014, the region had reached a point where significant portions of the populations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Somalia and South Sudan were facing humanitarian crises. In Somalia, nearly 900,000 people are estimated to be in need of urgent and life-saving assistance while 2 million more require continued support (Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2014a). More than 7 million people were food insecure in South Sudan and 1.5 million people internally displaced. A June 2014 crisis response plan called for the mobilization of \$1.8 billion in 2014 alone (Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian

Affairs, 2014b). In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 6.4 million people were identified as being in need of assistance. A November 2013 crisis response plan called for \$832 million in funding for the 2014 period (Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2013). Furthermore, a number of health challenges remain acute. For instance, the World Health Organization estimates that 21,000 women died of complications during pregnancy or childbirth in 2013 alone. This equates to 1 death every 25 minutes.

The additional, more indirect relationship between vulnerability to natural disasters, humanitarian need and social cohesion can be seen in health indicators. For instance, children in Kenya aged 5 or younger were 50 per cent more likely to be malnourished if they were born during a drought year. Similarly, in Ethiopia, they were 36 per cent more likely to be malnourished. At the time of research, this equated to 2 million additional malnourished children in Ethiopia (UNDP, 2007). Malnourishment has long-term implications for human development in an individual, which directly impacts on that individual's ability to prosper in society.

Eight of the 10 countries with the highest food security risk in the world are in Africa and 7 of those 8 are in Eastern Africa.

Perhaps of greatest concern is the food security risk. A 2013 analysis by the global risk assessment firm, Maplecroft, found that 8 of the 10 countries with the highest food security risk in the world are in Africa and 7 of those 8 are in Eastern Africa. They are Burundi, the Comoros, Eritrea, Ethiopia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Somalia (jointly ranked as having the highest risk) and South Sudan (Maplecroft 2013).

Looking forward, the continued vulnerability of population groups to natural disasters presents a further threat to social cohesion. For this reason, contingent plans to deal with the impact of climate change should remain high on the policy

²¹ OECD, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.

radar. Climate change has caused increasing floods in Kenya, the degradation of ecosystems in Uganda and the United Republic of Tanzania and declines in soil fertility in the Comoros, Madagascar and Seychelles. In all, the International Fund for Agricultural Development (2011) postulates that climate change could cause net reductions of 10 per cent or more in the production of maize and other major crops in East and Southern Africa.

In short, the history of humanitarian crises in the region and the exposure to the risk of future crises present major challenges to building a more cohesive region. To address these challenges, policymakers can look to successful initiatives already developed in the region. Ethiopia's Productive Safety Net Programme was established in 2005 and covered 7.6 million people by 2012. It provides chronically food insecure households with cash and food transfers. The Government of Ethiopia estimates that nearly 500,000 households graduated from the programme between 2008 and 2012 (World Food Programme, 2012).

Similarly, the Tanzania Social Action Fund (TASAF) was established by the Government with the objective of enabling poor households to increase their incomes. The fund was modelled on the Productive Safety Net Programme for Ethiopia. Its scope of functions and beneficiaries have since expanded and it aims reaching 7.5 million direct beneficiaries during the 2012–2017 programme period (TASAF, 2014). These initiatives provide useful templates for strengthening the coping ability of society to natural crises.

D. Inequality

There is a broad and emerging consensus about the negative impact that high levels of inequality can inflict on economic and social development.²² Inequality represents a serious challenge to social cohesion for a number of reasons. It can contribute to perceptions of unfairness and compromise efforts to build solidarity and civic participation. Wilkinson and Pickett (2009) present empirical evidence that suggests that inequality has a per-

²² See, for example, Ortiz and Cummins (2011), Ostry, Berg and Tsangarides (2014), Wilkinson and Pickett (2009) and Alesina and Rodrik (1994).

nicious impact on levels of trust in society and, as such, it undermines social cohesion. Moreover, the impact of inequality is felt by all segments of society, as argued by UNDP (2014b, p. 39): "Inequality matters not only for those at the poorest end of the distribution, but for society as a whole – as it threatens social cohesion and hampers social mobility, fuelling social tensions that can lead to civil unrest and political instability."

Inequality has a pernicious impact on levels of trust in society and, as such, it undermines social cohesion.

Inequalities can be measured along multiple dimensions, including income, geography and gender. In this section, we assess some of the available data in Eastern Africa on each of these different dimensions.

Income inequality

The trajectory of income inequality in Eastern Africa and the extent to which it poses a challenge for social cohesion is difficult to determine authoritatively. Assessments of income inequality are dependent upon the time period examined and the indicator chosen. The most commonly used measure of income inequality is the GINI coefficient, which measures the distribution of income across population shares and assigns an index value between 0 and 1. Higher values represent larger degrees of inequality. A GINI coefficient of 1 is complete inequality, where one unit of the population has all the wealth and the remaining units have none.

Despite its limitations,²³ the GINI coefficient provides useful information about Eastern Africa. Examining GINI coefficient data back to the 1980s – the earliest period for which comparable World Bank data is available – the picture is mixed. Income inequality in Burundi, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar and Uganda has fluctuated, rising in some periods and falling in others. In Rwanda, inequality has generally fallen over the last three

²³ See, for example, Atkinson and Brandolini (2001).

measures. Seychelles and the United Republic of Tanzania both manifest clear signs of a gradual increase in inequality. Meanwhile, there is insufficient data to draw conclusions about the Comoros and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, beyond observing that the GINI coefficient for both countries is relatively high.

However, looking back to inequality levels to as far back as the 1980s ignores the fact that there have been massive economic and political shifts since that time. Arguably, the GINI coefficients from that period are not comparable. It is therefore useful to examine the absolute value of current GINI coefficients in addition to their trajectory. From this perspective, there is an unambiguous cause for concern. Seven countries have a GINI coefficient above 0.40, including three with a coefficient above 0.50. In comparison, China has a GINI coefficient of 0.42, which has been deemed by political leaders to be sufficiently high to constitute a threat to social stability and economic growth, as noted in ECA SRO-EA²⁴ (2013). Furthermore, Seychelles and the Comoros have some of the highest GINI coefficients in the world, at 0.65 (table 12).

There is a general sentiment that inequality is rising in the region and many have voiced concern about this trend.

At the same time, perceptions of inequality are just as important, if not more important, than technical measures of it. In this respect, it is arguable that there is a general sentiment that inequality is rising in the region and many have voiced concern about this trend.²⁵ Such sentiment is bolstered by powerful statistical “sound bites” that illustrate the growing divides. For example, a recent analysis of inequality in Kenya, Uganda and the United Republic of Tanzania by Taylor (2014), claims that the richest 1 per cent of the population in those countries holds as much wealth as the poorest 91 per cent. Reputedly, just six people own as much wealth as half of the population.

²⁴ SRO-EA, Subregional Office for Eastern Africa.

²⁵ See, for example, discussion in Ligami (2013) and SID (2013).

In addition, the degree of inequality in a society often expresses itself through the conspicuous consumption of luxury goods. In an anecdotal, but revealing, indicator of inequality, figure 7 shows champagne exports to Eastern Africa.²⁶ Despite having the third lowest HDI in the region, as well as the largest number of people living in poverty, the Democratic Republic of the Congo leads the region in consumption of imported champagne followed by Seychelles and Ethiopia.²⁷

Spatial inequality

As a large and well-established body of work by economic geographers testifies, capitalist economic development is generally accompanied by spatial inequalities, as some regions develop more rapidly than others (Schwartz, 2009; Chisholm, 1990). In more extreme cases, development may even be accompanied by the absolute decline of marginalized, geographically more peripheral, regions.

In its most common form, wealth differences can develop between rural and urban populations. However, this is not the only form of spatial inequality. Spatial inequality can also exist between land-locked and coastal areas, between primary and secondary cities and between areas that are better and worse placed to exploit technological innovations.

Spatial inequality appears to be a major challenge in Eastern Africa. Within the five countries of the East African Community, the poorest 40 per cent of people (about 56 million people) generally live in rural areas and slums around towns. Their average income is just \$225 per year, compared with the average income of \$2,100 per year for the richest 10 per cent of all people in the region (Society for International Development, 2013).

²⁶ The data used in this report comes from the French Comite Champagne, which is the trade association that represents the interests of independent champagne producers and champagne houses.

²⁷ Seychelles has a very small population (the second smallest in Africa), whereas Ethiopia has the second-largest population in Africa. Accordingly, on a per capita basis, Seychelles consumes a very large amount of champagne, consistent with its high GINI figures. However, this could potentially be due to the high numbers of tourists who visit the country.

Table 12: Income Inequality, GINI Coefficient

	1980s	1990s		2000s		2010s	
Burundi		33 1992	42 1998	33 2006			
Comoros				64 2004			
Dem. Rep. of the Congo				44 2005			
Djibouti				40 2002		45 2012	
Ethiopia	32 1981		40 1995	30 1999	30 2005		34 2010
Kenya		57 1992	42 1994	46 1997	48 2005		
Madagascar	47 1980	46 1993	39 1997	42 1999	47 2001	39 2005	40 2010
Rwanda					51 2001	52 2006	49 2011
Seychelles				43 1999	65 2006		
Uganda	44 1989	43 1992	37 1996	43 1999	46 2002	43 2005	44 2009
United Rep. of Tanzania		34 1992			35 2001	35 2007	34 2012

Source: World Bank PovCal (2014) and national authorities.


Within the East African Community, the poorest 40 per cent of people (about 56 million people) generally live in rural areas and slums around towns. Their average income is just \$225 per year.

Rural versus urban inequalities also exist in other countries in the wider region. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, for example, about three quarters of residents in rural areas live in poverty while the ratio falls to slightly less than two thirds in urban areas (the International Fund for Agricultural Development, 2014). The problem is compounded by variations in the quality and quantity of public services. In the United Republic of Tanzania, for example, a much higher proportion of urban health facilities (60 per cent) have electricity, clean water and improved sanitation than rural health facilities (5 per cent) (Society for International Development, 2013). In Uganda, the northern region is considered to be “lagging behind” with lower rates of education improvements than other parts of the country (Higgins,

2009). Government programmes to address these inequalities have had mixed success so far.²⁸

Geographical inequalities in service delivery do not uniformly flow one way. In the United Republic of Tanzania, healthcare facilities in urban areas are achieving higher rates of diagnostic accuracy than they are in rural areas, yet medical personnel in rural areas are more likely to turn up for work than their counterparts in urban areas. Similar contrasts exist in education. Infrastructure of schools is much worse in rural parts of the United Republic of Tanzania (only 2 per cent of rural schools are considered to have adequate infrastructure), whereas teaching time is worse in urban areas of the country (children in urban areas are taught for 27 per cent of the scheduled teaching time) (Society for International Development, 2013).

²⁸ One example is the Youth Opportunities Programme, aimed at addressing geographical and age-based inequalities. The assessment by Blattman, Fiala and Martinez (2013) of the programme found positive economic outcomes, including increased investment and incomes. However, it was not found to have had any impact on improved social cohesion, as measured by individual community integration, collective action and other measures.

Figure 7: Regional champagne consumption (in bottles of 75 cl)

Source: *Comite Champagne (2013)*.

Indeed, it is becoming increasingly more accurate to view regional inequalities not in terms of differences between nations, but rather in terms of subnational differences. Children in the poorest parts of Kenya (the richest member State of the EAC), for instance, suffer similar deprivations as children from Burundi. Thus north-eastern Burundi, Dodoma in the United Republic of Tanzania and Karamoja in Uganda are united by the unfortunate fact that they display high rates of child malnutrition. Similarly, in terms of access to education or infrastructure provision, northern Uganda has many similar challenges to those of central United Republic of Tanzania.

Yet there are only a few tools for mapping the degree of subnational inequalities in social development. In this context, ECA is elaborating the African Social Development Index, a composite index that estimates the depth of exclusion at the subnational level in six key dimensions of individual well-being across the life cycle.²⁹ It establishes a measurable index to monitor progress in bridging the gap between those who are able to achieve full development and those excluded from mainstream development. Work is ongoing on pilot studies across the Eastern Africa region and will be hopefully concluded in 2016.

²⁹ These dimensions are survival, health, education, employment, productive income and decent life.

Gender inequality

Addressing gender inequality is generally agreed to be an important component of social development. When through gender discrimination and marginalization, 50 per cent or more of the population is denied their proper role and status in society, it is difficult to claim that a society is “socially cohesive”.

Eastern Africa is rightly proud to be the birthplace of a number of inspiring women who have achieved success on a global level or acted as powerful and well-celebrated agents for change. Wangari Maathai of Kenya, for instance, received a Nobel Peace Prize.

However, these achievements stand in contrast with concerns about the state of gender equality. In the 2014 Gender Inequality Index by UNDP,³⁰ the seven countries in the region that were measured were all clustered in the bottom half of the rankings of 152 countries (table 13).

³⁰ The Gender Inequality Index measures inequality in three dimensions: “reproductive health measured by maternal mortality ratio and adolescent birth rates; empowerment, measured by proportion of parliamentary seats occupied by females and proportion of adult females and males aged 25 years and older with at least some secondary education; and economic status expressed as labour market participation and measured by labour force participation rate of female and male populations aged 15 years and older.” More details are available from <http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/gender-inequality-index-gii>. Last viewed 22 October 2014.


Table 13: Gender Equality (as reflected in UNDP’s Gender Inequality Index)

Regional position	Global position /152)	Country	Index value
-	1	Slovenia	0.021
1	79	Rwanda	0.410
2	104	Burundi	0.501
3	115	Uganda	0.529
4	121	Ethiopia	0.547
5	122	Kenya	0.548
6	124	United Rep. of Tanzania	0.553
7	147	Dem. Rep. of the Congo	0.669
-	152	Yemen	0.733

Source: UNDP (2014a).

Note: Not measured – the Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Madagascar, Seychelles, Somalia and South Sudan.

Figure 8: Percentage of women aged between 15 and 49 who have experienced violence since age 15



Source: Demographic and Health Survey (2015).

It is worth noting that Somalia and South Sudan were not ranked in the index. In Somalia, “violence against women cuts across all social and economic strata” according to UNDP (2012, p. 23). In South Sudan, a 2013 survey by CARE found out that gender-based violence is common but not commonly reported (CARE, 2014). The country also has one of the highest maternal mortality rates in the world, although it is slightly lower than Somalia.

Violence against women is also a significant issue in other countries in the region. According to

results from their respective Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) studies in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda, most women aged between 15 and 49 have experienced some form of violence (figure 8).

Beyond violence, gender inequality manifests itself in other ways, such as access to economic resources. In Rwanda, for example, only 30 per cent of family farms are owned and managed by women even though women do the bulk of the production work (UNCTAD, 2014). In the United Republic of Tanzania, salaries paid to women are

63 per cent lower than those paid to men (Wane and Morisset, 2012).

In fact, there are many Eastern African countries that have taken an active stance to address some of these issues. In the United Republic of Tanzania, national policies include the Women and Gender Development Policy 2000 and the National Plan for the Prevention and Eradication of Violence against Women and Children 2001–2015. In Uganda, the National Population Policy Action Plan 2011–2015 includes provisions aimed directly at gender inequality. Republic of Uganda (2010, p. xiv) notes that in Uganda, “the ability of women to participate effectively in reproductive health decision-making is undermined by strong socio-cultural influences and weak economic power”. Accordingly, among a number of tasks and goals allocated, it directs the Ministry of Gender, Labour and Social Development to mainstream gender in its activities, advocate for the prevention of gender-based violence and assist districts in implementing gender programmes.

Perhaps most notably, however, is the case of Rwanda, where the Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda 2008 includes clauses aimed at addressing gender discrimination. For instance, it requires that at least 30 per cent of posts in decision-making organs be held by women. In 2008, Rwanda became the first country in history to have more women members of parliament than men. More recently, at least 60 per cent or more of parliamentary seats are held by women, the highest proportion of any Government in the world.³¹ There is a Minister for Gender and Family Promotion in the Prime Minister’s Office that oversees a number of policies that make up a framework for gender equality (Abbott and Rucogoza (2011) gives a more detailed account of this framework).

The importance of addressing gender equality and women’s empowerment cannot be overemphasized. Progress in terms of enhancing social cohesion will be elusive while such large gaps in gender equality persist. Monitoring the gaps is thus of fundamental importance. In this context,

In 2008, Rwanda became the first country in history to have more women members of parliament than men.

ECA is developing the African Gender and Development Index – a composite index that, according to ECA (2011a, p. viii), aims at assisting member States to “measure the gap in the status of women and men in Africa and to assess progress made by African Governments in implementing the gender policies they have developed”.

E. Trust

Trust is an essential building block for creating cohesive and prosperous societies. It is vital for resolving collective action problems and allowing communities to advance together, being often referred to as an element of “social capital” (Nannetti, Putnam and Leonardi, 1993; Fukuyama, 1996). From an economic perspective, higher levels of trust in society are also associated with higher levels of economic growth (Knack and Keefer, 1997). One of the ways in which this occurs, according to Dearmon and Grier (2009), is that trust facilitates greater investments in physical and human capital, lifting the economy to higher rates of growth. There is also a positive association between levels of trust among individuals in society and levels of well-being (Salehi, and others 2014).

In fact, trust features prominently as an important consideration in a number of social phenomena in the region, such as the HIV/AIDS epidemic. For instance, according to Bujra (2000, pp. 65–66), “the concept of ‘trust’ is central to the way people in [the United Republic of] Tanzania talk about AIDS... This invisible danger, this terrifying unknowingness, this threat which undercuts the possibility of rational action, actually throws people back onto faith – even as this in itself compounds the risk.”

The perceived level of trust in a society is often used as a measure of that society’s cohesiveness, such as in Boehnke, and others (2013). Indeed, in Kenya, its National Cohesion and Integration Commission used trust as one of its key measures of social cohesion in its 2013 report.

³¹ As at 1 May 2015, according to the Inter-Parliamentary Union.

According to Bhavnani and Backer (2000), levels of trust within communities may also explain differences in patterns of conflict in Burundi and

Trust is an essential building block for creating cohesive and prosperous societies.

Rwanda during the 1990s. Those communities that had high levels of trust generally experienced shorter, more intense episodes of violence than those communities that had low levels of trust. In the latter communities, violence was more moderate but also more prolonged and persistent.

A Gallup World Poll (Gallup, 2007) painted an intriguing picture about levels of trust in Eastern Africa. Respondents were requested to imagine that they had lost their wallet in their neighbourhood. They were then asked whether they thought that the wallet would be returned to them if it was found by the police, a neighbour or a stranger. The perceived likelihood of whether the wallet will be returned to the owner can be used as a rough proxy for trustworthiness. Neighbours were viewed as having higher levels of trustworthiness than the police in all Eastern African countries surveyed (table 14). More generally,

Rwanda illustrated some of the highest levels of trustworthiness in the world. With respect to trusting neighbours, only five countries in the world (Finland, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland and Ireland) reported higher levels of trustworthiness than Rwanda. Further, 36 per cent of respondents in Rwanda reported that they would expect a stranger to return the wallet, the third-highest proportion in the world. In contrast, only 4 per cent of Tanzanians would expect the wallet to be returned by a stranger (Gallup, 2007).

Further analysis of levels of trust in Kenya was undertaken by the National Cohesion and Integration Commission in 2013. It found out that 47 per cent of rural respondents and 38 per cent of urban respondents did not trust others in their community. Levels of trust varied across different regions within Kenya. On average, those regions that had higher levels of trust and social cohesion tended to be more prosperous (Oruko, 2014).

While lack of qualitative data on the subject in the region precludes further analysis, suffice to say that the area remains a very rich one for further research. From the available data at the regional level, it appears that levels of trust are low, particularly with respect to the police. This has important implications for governance and service delivery, which is discussed further below.

Table 14: Trustworthiness (Percentage of respondents replying “yes” to a question about whether a neighbour or the police would return their lost wallet)*

Country	Neighbour	Police
Burundi	60	35
Ethiopia	63	44
Kenya	62	23
Madagascar	56	53
Rwanda	88	87
United Rep. of Tanzania	39	25

Source: Gallup, 2007.

* The question was: “In the city or area where you live, imagine that you lost your wallet... or something holding your identification or address... and it was found by someone else. Do you think your wallet (or valuables) would be returned to you if it was found by a neighbour / the police?”

F. Labour markets

As discussed earlier, the economies of Eastern Africa are performing well when measured against the yardstick of economic growth. However, they must also perform well in the sense of creating meaningful and inclusive job opportunities if they are to contribute to building cohesive societies. Long periods of unemployment can result in economic and social exclusion and impaired human development (Beleva, 1997; UNDP, 2006; International Labour Organization – ILO, 2007). This also widens the gap between the rich and the poor even further (Morsy, 2012).

Widespread youth unemployment can lead to a generation that is excluded socially and at a risk of poverty. For the few that manage to obtain a formal sector job, initial unemployment can have significant negative effects on lifetime earnings (OECD, 2010).

Unemployment rates are low at national levels for most countries in the region (table 15). The unemployment rates of all countries are estimated to be in single-digit figures, with some countries achieving official unemployment rates as low as 0.6 per cent in the case of Rwanda. This is lower than unemployment rates experienced in many high-income countries.³² However, the unemployment rate differs across age group, gender and region. Looking at national figures can obscure important challenges in each of these areas. In Kenya, for example, the unemployment rate of 20 year olds was estimated to be 35 per cent in 2005/2006. At the same time, the number of unemployed youth has been projected to double by 2035 if rates of population growth relative to job creation persist (UNDP, 2013).

In addition, underemployment is a highly important phenomenon in the region. Underemployment refers to the situation in which the productive capacity of the worker is not fully utilized (ILO, 2015). It is difficult to accurately measure underemployment. Nonetheless, the most recent estimates for the United Republic of Tanzania (2006)

³² For example, according to the International Labour Organization, the unemployment rate for Spain was 25.2 per cent in 2013, for the United Kingdom – 7.9 per cent, and for Germany – 5.4 per cent.

Table 15: Unemployment rates in Eastern Africa (2012 – International Labour Organization estimates)

Country	Rate (percentage)
Burundi	7.7
Comoros	7.0
Dem. Rep. of the Congo	7.2
Eritrea	7.9
Ethiopia	5.4
Kenya	9.2
Madagascar	3.6
Rwanda	0.6
Somalia	7.6
Uganda	4.2
United Rep. of Tanzania	3.5

Source: *African Economic Outlook (2015)*.

Note: *Missing observations for Djibouti, the Seychelles and South Sudan.*

and Uganda (2009) were that underemployment rates were 7.8 per cent and 3.5 per cent respectively (ILO, 2015).

A further difficulty is creating jobs to match the increased education profile of youth. In Ethiopia, Rwanda, Uganda and the United Republic of Tanzania, the unemployment rate is higher for those with secondary education or more than for those with basic or no education (table 16). There are also gender and regional equality dimensions to youth unemployment, as discussed in Semboja (2007).

The non-financial benefits of jobs are significant factors in quality of life, feelings of social inclusion and general perceptions of happiness.

The way in which the economies in the region transform over time is also highly relevant to the labour outcomes they produce. Developing countries are often encouraged to adopt a traditional model of structural transformation in which they shift from a reliance on agriculture into having greater shares of employment in the industrial

Table 16: Youth unemployment by level of education (Percentage of youth labour force with education level that is unemployed)

	No education	Basic education	Secondary education	Vocational	University/Tertiary
Dem. Rep. Congo	0	0	0.1		4.8
Ethiopia	1.9	6.9	37	21.6	13.5
Rwanda	4.6	5.1	20.2	10.7	
Uganda	0.9	2.1	6.3	6.6	19
United Rep. of Tanzania	2.3	8.1	32.8	23.4	23.2

Source: *African Economic Outlook (2014)*.

sector that tends to have higher productivity (ECA, 2014). However, few countries in Eastern Africa have followed this prescription, as ECA SRO-EA³³ (2013) discusses in more detail. As an example, in Uganda, the share of the agricultural sector's contribution to GDP declined significantly between 1990 and 2005. Yet, much of this growth went to the services sector, which has now become the largest sector. The industrial sector grew between 1990 and 2000 but was flat between 2000 and 2005 (Selassie, 2008).

Minimum wages can be an important tool for tackling poverty and in so doing, promoting social cohesion.

If industries in Eastern Africa that create less jobs are the industries which grow the strongest, this raises the concern of "jobless growth". Such growth can strain social cohesion (OECD, 2011). Structural transformation also has implications for spatial inequalities (discussed above) and internal migration (discussed below).

At the same time, labour markets have a direct bearing on social cohesion in a number of other ways. The generation and allocation of income in these markets affects poverty, inequality and perceptions of fairness. The non-financial benefits of jobs are significant factors in quality of life, feelings of social inclusion and general perceptions of happiness (Helliwell, Layard and Sachs, eds., 2013). Moreover,

jobs are often important platforms for institutions that foster social cohesion, such as social protection schemes and insurance (OECD, 2011).


Minimum wages can be an important tool for tackling poverty and in so doing, promoting social cohesion (OECD, 2011). It is often argued that minimum wages play no role in low-income countries as they are considered to be not possible to implement in the context of widespread un- and underemployment. ECA (2012, p. 59) argues that this is not necessarily the case – and that minimum wages can set an important foundation or signal to employers. There is also a lot of evidence (albeit mostly from higher income countries) that minimum wage policies can protect the purchasing power of the most vulnerable workers and reduce the incidence of poverty.

Similarly, security of employment derived through employment protection legislation can have positive and negative effects for social cohesion. On the one hand, such measures tend to be beneficial for the well-being of those protected by reducing their exposure to income fluctuations. On the other hand, those outside the protection, such as those in the informal sector, are excluded and may feel a sense of unfairness. In addition, there is also a risk that employment protection institutions can limit turnover in the labour market in such a way that it makes it difficult for new entrants, such as the youth (OECD, 2011).

The persistence of the informal sector is also important. Workers in the informal sector are excluded from the protection of labour market

33 SRO-EA, Subregional Office for Eastern Africa.

Figure 9: Informality in the non-agricultural sector (Percentage of persons employed in the informal sector in total non-agricultural employment)



Source: *International Labour Organization (2015)*.

institutions as well as any workplace-based insurance schemes or social security transfers. Gauging the extent of informality is difficult because of its nature. Nonetheless, the best available estimates suggest that high levels of informality persist in the region (figure 9).

G. Migration

Migration is an important phenomenon in our globalizing world; whether that migration is driven by social, economic or other factors. As Demireva (2014) discusses in more detail, there is a significant body of research that examines the relationship between diversity and social cohesion, often confusing the concepts of diversity and immigration.

While a whole host of benefits can be derived from migration, both to the host and source country, under some circumstances, it can put pressure on the social fabric of a community. For example, host country populations sometimes view immigrants with suspicion and blame them for the economic and social ills of the country. Failure to integrate migrants can lead to tensions that ultimately manifest themselves in conflict (Hugo, 2005). Over the long term, it is also sometimes claimed that migration can have an impact upon national identity (Saggar and others, 2012). The media and public opinion play an important role

in determining whether desirable or undesirable outcomes are perceived (Hugo, 2005).

Under particular circumstances, new arrivals to a region may put additional pressure on the job market, which can be a problem in countries already struggling to generate enough jobs for their citizens (Adepoju, 2007). This has been identified as an area of particular importance in small countries. For instance, the population of Seychelles is 90,000, yet it received 6,000 foreigners moving to the country between 2010 and 2013. Ensuring that meaningful job opportunities remain available for Seychellois is an important socioeconomic priority for the country (International Organization for Migration, 2013a).

Migrants may also be excluded from social services (for example, health care) and key institutions (for example, legal services) essential for cohesion (OECD, 2011). For example, tuberculosis, measles and other vaccine-preventable diseases are a particular difficulty for migrant communities in Kenya, due in part, to a lack of access to health services (International Organization for Migration, 2011).

However, as discussed earlier (and explored in more detail in Boehnke, and others, 2013), social cohesion is not the absence of diversity but the

Host country populations sometimes view migrants with suspicion and blame them for the economic and social ills of the country. Failure to integrate migrants can lead to tensions that ultimately manifest themselves in conflict.

management of it in a way that creates a sense of community. Furthermore, Hugo (2005) notes that new technology ensures that most “modern” migrants reach their destination country with some knowledge about it and, most importantly, their own social capital. That is, they are likely to have friends or relatives in their destination country. On paper, at least, this would appear to limit the destabilizing effect that migration might have on social cohesion.

In fact, there are a host of benefits that flow from migration. Migrants contribute skills to the host country, including alleviating skill-shortages, knowledge, investment and employment creation. They also contribute remittances to their country of origin. The wider spread of people enhances market flexibility, productivity and economic growth.³⁴ The House of Commons International Development Committee (2004, p. 3) notes that, “migration is not a panacea for development problems, but properly managed it can deliver major benefits in terms of development and poverty reduction”).

In Eastern Africa, the nature of migration is complex, with countries in the region simultaneously hosting and assisting internally displaced persons, refugees, returnees, victims of trafficking and labour migrants. These complex migration flows have been driven by equally complex factors.³⁵ They are also part of a broader global trend in which migration between developing coun-

34 For a much more comprehensive discussion of the benefits and costs of labour migration, see UNDP (2009); the World Bank (2009); and Commander, Kangasniemi and Winters (2004).

35 Factors contributing to the large numbers of refugees in the region include climate change and environmental degradation, armed conflicts and political, economic and food crises, which force people to flee their homes.

tries is greater, and increasing at a faster rate, than migration from low-income to high-income countries (OECD, 2011). In fact, it is estimated that 63 per cent of all migrants from sub-Saharan Africa move to countries within their region (World Bank, 2011b).

Periods of intense migratory activity in Eastern African date back to the earliest human migrations of prehistory. During the pre-colonial era, Eastern Africa’s diverse climatic regions played a significant role in influencing the socioeconomic structures of the communities that inhabited them.

The region has a number of nomadic ethnic groups including Beja, Afar, Baggara, Blemmyes, Hadendoa Samburu and Vezo that are spread across countries including Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Somalia and South Sudan. Other external forces that historically induced migration within the region include the slave trade by Arab traders, which lasted from the ninth to the nineteenth centuries when the trade was abolished (Martin, 1974).

Immigration and diversity within a population is not inherently detrimental to social cohesion.

During the colonial period, the mobility of indigenous Africans was highly restricted by colonial regimes, which promoted the immigration of Western metropolitan citizenry and members of the Asian community (mainly from India) to provide labour, particularly for the construction of railways (Adepoju, 1977). The recent history of the Eastern Africa region has seen a great level of forced migration, with numerous conflicts leading to displaced people fleeing across borders. One source of disputes stems from the very nature of how the borders are demarcated. Unlike other regions, the communities and ethnic groups in Africa are spread across several nation States since the Berlin Conference of 1884–1885. Their movement only became a problem when new political

Table 17: Refugees in country of asylum*

	2002	2007	2012	2013	2014
Burundi	40 533	24 483	41 813	45 490	52 931
Dem. Rep. of the Congo	332 978	177 390	65 109	113 362	119 747
Djibouti	21 702	6 651	19 139	20 015	20 502
Eritrea	3 619	5 042	3 600	3 166	2 898
Ethiopia	132 940	85 183	376 393	433 936	659 510
Kenya	233 671	265 729	564 933	534 938	551 336
Madagascar	-	-	9	12	6
Rwanda	30 863	53 577	58 212	73 349	73 812
Somalia	199	901	2 309	2 425	2 717
South Sudan			202 581	229 587	248 152
Uganda	217 302	228 959	197 877	220 555	385 498
United Rep. of Tanzania	689 373	435 630	101 021	102 099	88 492

Source: UNHCR (2014a).

* Including those in a refugee-like situation, as defined by UNHCR.

boundaries were imposed and border controls established.

These days, Kenya is the largest host country of refugees in the region, hosting an estimated 530,000 refugees in 2013 (table 17). This is the result of a sharp increase of refugees in recent years. As recently as 2007, Kenya hosted 265,000 refugees, half the number that it does today. The majority of its current refugees are from Somalia. In fact, between 2008 and 2013, Somalis made up about 88 per cent of all refugees in Kenya (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 2014a).

At the same time, northern parts of Kenya experience unique migration challenges due to the presence of nomadic and semi-nomadic pastoralists. In some instances, migration can compound public health issues in the country. As the International Organization for Migration (2011) discusses in more detail, urban migrants in Nairobi are often unable to access the necessary services for diagnosis and treatment. This leads to further transmission of diseases.

The second largest refugee population is hosted by Ethiopia, where the majority of refugees are

also from Somalia. They constituted 55 per cent of all refugees in Ethiopia in 2013 (UNHCR, 2014a).³⁶ The Somali displacement crisis, in fact, is a troubling issue for the region. In total, it is estimated that there are 965,000 Somali refugees, 94 per cent of which are hosted in Ethiopia, Kenya and Yemen (UNHCR, 2014b).

Social cohesion is not the absence of diversity but the management of it in a way that creates a sense of community.

Nonetheless, it is important to emphasize that the exchange of ideas and experience inherent in migratory movements is an essential part of building a regional identity and overcoming parochial attitudes. Put simply, greater migratory flows have the potential to contribute greatly to a stronger region, both in economic and social terms.

Regional policies have been put in place to this end. For example, in the East African Community,

³⁶ Although sizeable populations from other countries do exist, including from Eritrea (19 per cent), South Sudan (16 per cent) and the Sudan (8 per cent) (UNHCR, 2014a).

Chapter XVII of the EAC Treaty and the Common Market Protocol binds EAC members to “guarantee the free movement of workers who are citizens of other partner States, within their territories,” pursuant to article 10 (1). The use of the word “guarantee” is a strong stance. It places an obligation on partner States to act proactively, rather than only passively endorsing free movement. However, official intraregional migration remains surprisingly modest. More integrated labour markets such as the European Union and the United States have a much higher percentage of people who live outside their country of origin but within their regional commission (table 18).³⁷

Kenya is the largest host country of refugees in the region, having more than 530,000 refugees in 2013.

Within EAC, the main reasons for the stifled flow of migrants across borders lies in failures of implementation.³⁸ To begin, East African citizens seeking to work in another country within EAC are still required to obtain work permits.³⁹ The procedures for obtaining these permits vary across countries and can be costly. There are also issues related to business visa requirements.⁴⁰ In addition, the provisions directed at facilitating the free movement of labour are generally limited to highly skilled labourers, pursuant to Annex II of the Protocol. Yet, as Basnett (2013) discusses, the majority of

37 Of course, the United States and the European Union have been in existence as entities for much longer and have established a more integrated system of migration. The United States is also characterized by a high degree of linguistic and cultural homogeneity. Nonetheless, the point still stands about the relatively low degree of de facto mobility within EAC.

38 There are also issues in policy design in addition to the implementation issues discussed. For instance, Basnett (2013) points out that the permissible limitations to the free movement of labour set out in article 10 (11) of the Common Market Protocol are vague and leave much possibility for misuse. He also discusses a number of definitional issues in annex II of the Protocol. This annex sets the details of the conditions of exit, entry and stay of workers.

39 Regulation 6 (1) of annex II requires that a worker wishing to work in another partner State’s territory must apply for a work permit within 15 working days of arriving in the country and they must hold a contract for 90 days or more.

40 While a visa is not required for an initial period (30 days in the case of Burundi, up to 180 days in the case of Uganda), it is ultimately required for longer stays.

Table 18: Percentage of the population that lives in the region outside their country of nationality

Region	Percentage
United States	27.0
European Union (EU)-27	2.5
Eastern Africa	1.3

Source: SRO-EA calculations based on data from regional authorities.

regional migrants are semi-skilled and unskilled labourers.

At the same time, the region is dealing with another type of migration – migrants transiting through the region.⁴¹ These types of migrants put a burden on host country governments as the migrants frequently resort to unsafe modes of transportation and smuggling networks during their journey, exposing themselves to injury, violence, detention, exploitation and abuse (International Organization for Migration, 2013b).

H. Ethnic, religious and cultural differences

The relationship between social cohesion on the one hand, and differences along ethnic, religious and cultural lines on the other hand, periodically receives attention from major policymakers and leaders in the region. For example, in a September 2014 address to the United Nations, as cited in Kelley (2014b), President Kagame of Rwanda, argued that where there are weak national identities, “ethnicity, region and religion become the dominant currency of politics and nations are torn apart”.

Some analysts argue that ethnic fractionalization is a major determinant in the levels of conflict in Eastern Africa, with fractionalization taking on a greater importance in countries such as Kenya and Uganda than in other countries such as the

41 Three main routes exist: the Northern Africa route (from sub-Saharan Africa to North Africa and Europe); the Gulf of Aden and Red Sea route (from the Horn of Africa to Yemen and beyond); and the southern route (from the Horn of Africa and East Africa to South Africa and beyond).

United Republic of Tanzania (Barkan, 2012).⁴² Yet, this assertion seems anomalous when one considers that four of the most ethnically homogeneous countries in the region (Burundi, the Comoros, Rwanda and Somalia) have also experienced some of the most severe levels of conflict over the past 20 years.

The discourse on this subject in academic circles is divided. On the one hand, Easterly and Levine (1997) argue that in the case of sub-Saharan Africa, ethnic fragmentation makes it more difficult to provide public goods that promote economic growth. On the other hand, cultural diversity within a society can be associated with faster industrialization and greater economic growth (Ashraf and Galor, 2011).

Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) take the middle ground, suggesting that in high-income democracies, diversity can have a positive productivity effect, while in the developing world, similar levels of diversity can generate more conflict and involve lower levels of inter-ethnic cooperation. Apart from noting that ethnic diversity is a politically charged issue, Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) also argue that the way in which ethnic diversity is measured affects the accuracy of the results.

Sokoloff and Engerman (2000) take a similar view. Based on an analysis of historical political development in the Americas, they argue that differences in population homogeneity were one of the key explanatory factors behind cross-country differences in inequality as well as differences in the development, or lack thereof, of political institutions. This relationship could be positive (greater fractionalization creates greater inequality) or negative (the opposite). As argued by Easterly, and others (2006), ethnic differences can become focal points for developing cleavages in society, but they need not always do so as the differences are not inherently divisive.

⁴² Barkan (2012) notes that in both Kenya and Uganda, the largest ethnic group – the Kikuyu in Kenya and the Baganda in Uganda – benefited greatly from the pattern of uneven development that was established during the colonial era. In both cases, the largest group benefited from its proximity to the capital city and in both cases the largest ethnic group became the main producers of the country's leading export crop, coffee.

Recent research suggests that ethnic fractionalization is an endogenous variable (Casey and Owen, 2014). In other words, it evolves jointly with income inequality and economic growth and it is not independent from them. Furthermore, the extent of ethnic fractionalization is constantly changing. In Burundi, for instance, Chemouni (2014) argues that ethnic differences are becoming increasingly less divisive and that the tensions present in society are increasingly the product of other forces.

Precise estimations of the number of ethnic groups in Eastern Africa are difficult to come by and the estimates available tend to vary. This is partly due to definitional questions of ethnicity and how one ethnicity can be distinguished from another.⁴³ It is also related to the fact that some States in the region refrain from ethnic labelling altogether, often for well-founded historical reasons, such as in the case of Rwanda.

The region has a proud history of religious tolerance with countless examples of societies that have different religious groups living together harmoniously.

One of the few resources that provides estimates for all countries in the region, is the CIA World Factbook (table 19). The Factbook suggests that some countries have very large numbers of ethnic groups, such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the United Republic of Tanzania where the estimates are in triple figures. In contrast, Burundi, the Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Madagascar, Rwanda, Seychelles and Somalia all have less than ten ethnic groups.

In terms of religious beliefs, countries in Eastern Africa tend to fall into three categories (table 20). First, there are those countries where Christianity is, by far and away, the most popular religion. Seven countries fall into this category having more

⁴³ A discussion of the difficulties of using ethnicity as a variable in health research is provided in Senior and Bhopal (1994).

Table 19: Estimates of the number ethnic groups in each country

Country	Number
Burundi	5
Comoros	5
Dem. Rep. of the Congo	>200
Djibouti	>3*
Eritrea	9
Ethiopia	>14*
Kenya	>9*
Madagascar	6
Rwanda	3
Seychelles	5
Somalia	>3*
South Sudan	18
Uganda	>11*
United Rep. of Tanzania	>133*

Source: Central Intelligence Agency (2014).

Note: * Refers to the fact that the CIA Factbook groups multiple ethnicities in a category called "other." In the case of Djibouti, this category represents 5 per cent of the population and includes people of Arab, French, Ethiopian and Italian origin. In the case of Ethiopia, this category represents 10.5 per cent of the population but no examples are provided. In the case of Kenya, "other African" represents 15 per cent of the population and "other non-African" represents 1 per cent of the population and includes people of Asian, European and Arab origin. In Somalia, 15 per cent of the population is identified as "non-Somali." In the United Republic of Tanzania, "other" represents 1 per cent of the population and includes people of Asian, European and Arab origin. In the case of Uganda, the "other" group represents 29.6 per cent of the population and no examples are given.

than 80 per cent of the population identify with Christianity. These countries are: the Democratic Republic of the Congo (96 per cent), Seychelles (94 per cent), Rwanda (93 per cent), Burundi (92 per cent), Uganda (87 per cent), Kenya (85 per cent) and Madagascar (85 per cent).

The second category consists of those where nearly the entire population identifies itself as Muslims. These countries are the Comoros (98 per cent), Djibouti (97 per cent) and Somalia (99 per cent). The final category contains those countries that have a population of roughly two-thirds Christians and one-third Muslims. These countries are Eritrea, Ethiopia and the United Republic of Tanzania. The only country that does not fit neatly into this categorization is South Sudan. This is also the only country in the region where a significant proportion of the country (one third) holds traditional religious beliefs (Pew Research, 2012).

The relationship between religious diversity and social cohesion is not clear-cut. The region has a proud history of religious tolerance, including countless examples of societies that have multiple groups with different religious beliefs but that still live in harmony. However, recent developments, including those in the Horn of Africa, appear to be putting pressure on this harmony. In Somalia, for instance, the original protagonists in the civil war did not have any ideological or religious orientations.

Yet the current insecurity has acquired an increasingly religious element to it. In South-Central Somalia in particular, the conflict landscape is dominated by faith-based organizations, according to the 2014 research by the Life and Peace Institute. Therefore, while religious differences may not have posed a threat to social cohesion in Eastern Africa in the past, there is a risk that they are beginning to take a greater role.

Table 20: Religious beliefs

	Percentage of the population							
	Christian	Muslim	Unaffiliated	Hindu	Buddhist	Traditional	Other	Jewish
Burundi	91.5	2.8	< 0.1	< 0.1	< 0.1	5.7	< 0.1	< 0.1
Comoros	0.5	98.3	0.1	< 0.1	< 0.1	1.0	< 0.1	< 0.1
Dem. Rep. of the Congo	95.8	1.5	1.8	< 0.1	< 0.1	0.7	0.1	< 0.1
Djibouti	2.3	96.9	0.2	< 0.1	< 0.1	0.3	< 0.1	0.2
Eritrea	62.9	36.6	0.1	< 0.1	< 0.1	0.4	< 0.1	< 0.1
Ethiopia	62.8	34.6	< 0.1	< 0.1	< 0.1	2.6	< 0.1	< 0.1
Kenya	84.8	9.7	2.5	0.1	< 0.1	1.7	1.2	< 0.1
Madagascar	85.3	3.0	6.9	< 0.1	< 0.1	4.5	< 0.1	< 0.1
Rwanda	93.4	1.8	3.6	< 0.1	< 0.1	1.0	0.2	< 0.1
Seychelles	94.0	1.1	2.1	2.1	< 0.1	< 0.1	0.6	< 0.1
Somalia	< 0.1	99.8	< 0.1	< 0.1	< 0.1	< 0.1	< 0.1	< 0.1
South Sudan	60.5	6.2	0.5	< 0.1	< 0.1	32.9	< 0.1	< 0.1
Uganda	86.7	11.5	0.5	0.3	< 0.1	0.9	0.1	< 0.1
United Rep. of Tanzania	61.4	35.2	1.4	0.1	< 0.1	1.8	< 0.1	< 0.1

Source: *Pew Research (2012)*.

I. Demographic pressures

Changing population patterns can have a variety of impacts on cohesiveness within and across societies. In particular, high population growth can lead to competition for scarce resources, which drives conflict (OECD, 2012). High population growth is an important indicator of State fragility. The geographical locations of populations, including the phenomenon of urbanization, also influence cohesion, as is discussed in more detail below. At the same time, population growth can put pressure on existing social services, the availability of jobs and political participation.

In Eastern Africa, demographic pressures are certainly an important dynamic. Most countries' populations are growing at a rapid rate, above and beyond the world average (see table 21). The East African Community's population, in fact, grew at a rate of 2.9 per cent in 2013, more than double the world average for the period 2005–2010 (EAC, 2014).

There appears to be a link in some areas between population growth and conflict. South Sudan is

currently facing a period of instability and it also recorded the highest population growth rate in the region for the 2005–2010 period., the only country in the region to have recorded growth rates of higher than 4 per cent for that period. At a micro-level, researchers have found out that increased population density puts pressure on land and other resources, causing conflict; for instance, in Nakasongola and Bududa in Uganda (Kaggwa, Hogan and Gowa, 2009).

The pace of urbanization is also a relevant phenomenon to social cohesion. The term "urbanization" refers to the process whereby populations tend to concentrate in one or many areas, usually cities (Tisdale, 1942). This process has ambiguous effects on social cohesion. On the one hand, if cities make people richer, smarter, greener, healthier and happier, as argued by Glaeser (2012), then it would seem logical to assume that urbanization is conducive to stronger social cohesion. On the other hand, the creation of vast slums in mega cities places a strain on cohesion. About one third of the world's urban population (800 million people) is estimated to live in slums (OECD, 2011). In some

Table 21: Population growth rates (Percentage, forecasts based on a medium variant scenario)*

	2000-2005	2005-2010	2010-2015	2015-2020
Burundi	3.0	3.4	3.2	3.0
Comoros	2.6	2.6	2.4	2.2
Dem. Rep. of the Congo	2.8	2.8	2.7	2.6
Djibouti	1.4	1.4	1.5	1.4
Eritrea	4.2	3.4	3.2	2.7
Ethiopia	2.9	2.7	2.6	2.4
Kenya	2.7	2.7	2.7	2.5
Madagascar	3.0	2.8	2.8	2.7
Rwanda	2.3	2.8	2.7	2.6
Seychelles	1.8	0.9	0.6	0.4
Somalia	2.7	2.6	2.9	2.8
South Sudan	3.8	4.2	4.0	2.6
Uganda	3.4	3.4	3.3	3.2
United Republic of Tanzania	2.6	2.9	3.0	2.9
World	1.2	1.2	1.1	1.0

Source: United Nations Population Division (2013).

* For more information on this scenario and other measures, see United Nations Population Division (2013)

countries, urbanization is associated with rising spatial inequality as well as pressure on law and order institutions.

Eastern Africa is a remarkable region when it comes to urbanization. On the one hand, it has some of the lowest proportions of populations living in urban centres in the world. Less than a quarter of the population lives in urban areas in the following countries: Burundi (11 per cent), Ethiopia (17 per cent), Eritrea (22 per cent), Kenya (24 per cent), Rwanda (19 per cent), South Sudan (18 per cent) and the United Republic of Tanzania (16 per cent). This compares with a global urban population of 53 per cent.


At the same time, African youth are generally more educated and better informed than their parents. Being aware of their human rights, youth actively seek to engage governments regarding issues affecting them. Among these are unemployment levels that have continued to rise to unprecedented levels. Youth concerns have gained prominence with politicians. Many governments have

elaborated youth policies and recognize youth in their planning instruments –long and medium term. Others have gone a step further to involve youth in decision-making. The graph below (figure 10) shows the percentage of youth (0-14 years) who are in the not so distant future, likely to closely scrutinize implementation of the various government strategies and plans concerning them. With technology at their disposal, youth are likely to discuss and question any perceived slow or non-implementation of programmes

The rate of urbanization in Eastern Africa is exceptionally fast.


On the other hand, the rate of urbanization in Eastern Africa is exceptionally fast. Every country in the region, except Djibouti and Seychelles, is urbanizing at a rate faster than the global average (figure 11). Rwanda is urbanizing at a rate nearly three times as fast. The comparatively low rate of urbanization in Djibouti is due to the fact that it

Figure 10: Young population (Percentage of the total population aged between 0 and 14)



Source: *African Economic Outlook (2015)*.

Figure 11: Urban population growth (Annual percentage change in 2013)



Source: *United Nations and the World Bank (2014)*.

already has a very high proportion of its population living in urban areas. In its latest census, 70.6 per cent of the population was estimated to be living in an urban centre (Republic of Djibouti, 2013).

J. Substance abuse

Research has suggested that there is a link between stress and weak social networks on the one hand, and increased substance abuse on the other hand (Rhodes and Jason, 1990). High

rates of substance abuse can be a sign that some societal pressures are too great for segments of society. Similarly, relative differences in income within societies appear to have strong psychological implications that lead to larger differences in health outcomes (Wilkinson, 1997).

At the country level, alcohol consumption is relatively low, with the majority of Eastern African countries sitting in the bottom half of global rankings of alcohol consumption per capita (table

22). The countries with large Muslim populations in particular (the Comoros, Djibouti and Somalia,) all have exceptionally low consumption rates. The countries with the highest consumption rates are Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda. Yet even their consumption is only about half that of the world's largest consumer, Belarus (WHO, 2014).

That said, a deeper analysis unearths some areas of concern. The proportion of disorders caused by alcohol use is nearly double the African average (3.3 per cent) with Burundi and the United Republic of Tanzania both at 5.5 per cent, Rwanda and Uganda both at 5.8 per cent and Seychelles at 5.9 per cent. This is mainly driven by males, for example, the survey results suggest that 30.2 per cent of males in Rwanda consumed enough alcohol on one occasion within the past 30 days to be considered indulging in "heavy episodic drinking" (WHO, 2014).⁴⁴

The proportion of disorders caused by alcohol use [in the subregion] is nearly double the WHO African average.

The consumption of khat⁴⁵ is also a social problem in parts of Eastern Africa. Medical studies have not conclusively proven a causal relationship between khat consumption and mental illnesses, but this may be due to a lack of research on the matter rather than the absence of a causal relationship (Warfa, and others, 2007). Further, the impact of men spending large amounts of household income and time chewing khat is felt most strongly by their families and communities (WHO, 2008). Khat is illegal in the United Republic of Tanzania and Eritrea, but legal in Ethiopia, Djibouti, Kenya and Uganda.⁴⁶

44 Heavy episodic drinking was defined as consuming 60 grams or more of pure alcohol.

45 Note that khat is referred to using a number of different names including catha edius, kat, qad and miraa.

46 As at March 2009 (Fitzgerald, 2009).

Estimating the number of khat users in the region is challenging and the precise number of worldwide chewers is not known. There were 10 million users in East Africa and the Arabian Peninsula in the early 1990s, according to (Balint, Ghebrekidan and Balint, 1991). Other estimates since then have ranged between 5 and 10 million users worldwide (Mateen, 2010). If seizures of khat are related to its consumption, then khat consumption may be on the increase. This is because 1.5 tons of khat was seized in Africa in 2005. This increased to 23.4 tons in 2009 (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), 2011).

A large number of people in the diaspora from the region also chew khat. For example, khat valued at \$25 million was imported from Kenya to the United Kingdom in 2013, although this value will have since plummeted after khat was banned there (The Economist, 2014). As Klein, Beckerleg and Hailu (2009) discuss, the production and distribution of khat is largely completed by farmers and businesses in Africa. Accordingly, its effect on livelihoods and tax revenues, particularly in fragile States, must be borne in mind when controls or regulation of the substance are imposed.

Lastly, the consumption of illicit drugs, such as opium, cocaine and cannabis, is not considered a major problem for Eastern Africa relative to other parts of the world. For instance, the region is estimated to have one of the lowest rates of opiate use in the world.⁴⁷

However, there are concerns that the region is becoming an increasingly popular route for trafficking of illegal drugs. In particular, UNODC noted that there has been an increase in the transport of amphetamine-type-stimulants through East Africa on the way to markets in East Asia (UNODC, 2011).

In summary, there are signs that substance abuse is an emerging problem in the region. In the

47 UNODC (2014) provides more details. Note that the definition of East Africa by UNODC differs from the coverage of this report. Specifically, UNODC includes Mauritius and omits the Democratic Republic of the Congo and South Sudan.

Table 22: Pure alcohol consumption among adults (In litres per capita per year on average during the period 2008–2010)

Regional position (/13)	Global position (/195)	Country	Consumption
-	1	Belarus	17.5
1	43	Uganda	9.8
2	44	Rwanda	9.8
3	47	Burundi	9.3
4	66	United Rep. of Tanzania	7.7
5	103	Seychelles	5.6
6	121	Kenya	4.3
7	122	Ethiopia	4.2
8	133	Dem. Rep. of the Congo	3.6
9	154	Madagascar	1.8
10	161	Djibouti	1.3
11	166	Eritrea	1.1
12	181	Somalia	0.5
13	185	Comoros	0.2

Source: World Health Organization (2014).

Note: Data for South Sudan are not available.

absence of effective national and regional policies to counter these trends, the problem may grow, particularly as incomes and opportunities for substance abuse also grow.

K. Governance and service delivery

Weak governance poses a threat to social cohesion for a number of reasons, many of which have been extensively explored in other reports.⁴⁸ One key reason is that it tends to undermine trust in government institutions. As discussed earlier, levels of trust in government agents, such as the police, are generally not very high in Eastern Africa. This can give rise to difficulties in a number of areas, such as financing public services. Citizens generally tend to be less willing to pay taxes to their Government if they do not have trust that the government will spend it in worthwhile ways. In some countries, such as in Somalia, resistance to tax collection has turned violent. In Mogadishu, 25 tax collectors have reportedly been killed since 2012, which is about 1 in every 5 tax collectors in the city (Mohamed, 2014).

With respect to governance in the region, the promising steps discussed in Section One are highly relevant. Reducing infant mortality and increasing education coverage in such an accelerated rate reflects improved service provision and has a major impact over the long term on enhancing social cohesion. There are also other promising developments regarding locally based approaches to governance and service delivery.

As an example, the Rwandan system of Imihigo is widely considered as a successful home-grown governance arrangement. Imihigo describes the pre-colonial cultural practice where an individual sets targets or goals to be achieved within a specific period of time. The person must complete these objectives by following guiding principles and be determined to overcome any possible challenges that arise. Decentralization in 2000 and a shift in the responsibilities of all levels of government in Rwanda necessitated a new approach to monitoring and evaluation. Local levels of government were from then responsible for implementing development programmes, which meant that the central Government and the people of

48 See, for example, Boehnke, and others (2013); and Jenson (2010).

Rwanda needed a way to ensure accountability. In 2006, Imihigo was introduced to address this need.

Since its introduction, Imihigo has been credited with improving accountability and quickening the pace of citizen-centred development activities and programmes. The practice of Imihigo has now been extended to ministries, embassies and public service staff.

In neighbouring Burundi, traditional governance institutions, like central government agencies, have tended to be weak following long periods of insecurity. However, research from the North South Institute has found that informal groups, such as elders, traditional leaders and women's groups, tend to fill the governance gap that these institutions have left. As such, they play an important role in maintaining social cohesion, particularly in respect of protecting women and youth (Besada, Wheaton and O'Bright, 2014).

At the same time, there are a number of ongoing challenges in the region with regard to governance and service delivery. Perceptions about government performance are generally negative. Table 23 summarizes responses to questions about perceived government performance in a selection of Eastern African countries. In all the countries surveyed, the majority of respondents felt that their government's efforts to manage the economy, improve the living standards of the poor, create jobs and narrow the gap between the rich and the poor have been either very bad or fairly bad.

In addition, weak governance tends to be associated with poor service delivery (Loffler and Bovaird, 2002). There are numerous instances of poor service delivery in the region. In Kenya, for instance, assessments of service delivery indicators in health and education suggest much room for improvement. One study claimed that teacher classroom absence rates were as high as 49 per cent in rural public schools and 42 per cent across all schools (Martin and Pimhidzai, 2013). In the United Republic of Tanzania, teacher absenteeism may be even higher, with research suggesting that teachers are often absent from the class-

room more than half the time (World Bank, 2012). Improving incentives and investing in these areas is essential if public health and education services are to meet the needs of a country's citizens.

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From the reverse perspective, social cohesion can also have an impact upon governance. Cross-country evidence (Woo, 2009) suggests that countries with greater levels of polarization tend to have Governments that incur higher budget deficits and that engage in more procyclical fiscal policies.⁴⁹ Thus, there is a risk of a vicious circle; poor governance creates weaker social cohesion, which then incentivizes further poor governance.

An important tool for breaking this cycle, however, is education. Education systems that are inclusive can build more cohesive societies. This is because inclusive education systems facilitate social mobility, reduce the likelihood that generations are left behind and enable greater civic participation in governance (OECD, 2011). According to Gradstein and Justman (1999), education promotes stronger social cohesion by facilitating a common culture and building human capital.

The important achievements in improving access to education in the region that were discussed in section one are relevant in this regard. However, problems remain. Indeed, there is a huge gap between the education outcomes of public and private schools in many parts of the region. In

⁴⁹ Procyclical fiscal policies are when a Government spends, in an expansionary manner, in good times and in a contractionary manner during bad times. Woo (2009) finds that such policies are strongly, negatively associated with economic growth.

Table 23: Ratings of economic management by the government

Survey question: "Now let's speak about the present government of this country. How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven't you heard enough to say: managing the economy?" (percentage of respondents)

Response	Burundi (2014/2015)	Kenya (2014/2015)	Madagascar (2011/2013)	Uganda (2011/2013)	United Rep. of Tanzania (2014/2015)
Very badly	30	32	17	52	15
Fairly badly	31	25	56	29	38
Fairly well	26	35	15	15	41
Very well	11	7	1	3	2
Don't know; haven't heard	3	1	12	2	4

Survey question: "Now let's speak about the present government of this country. How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven't you heard enough to say: improving the living standards of the poor." (percentage of respondents)

Response	Burundi (2014/2015)	Kenya (2014/2015)	Madagascar (2011/2013)	Uganda (2011/2013)	United Rep. of Tanzania (2014/2015)
Very badly	40	41	29	48	27
Fairly badly	35	31	59	29	41
Fairly well	17	23	7	19	29
Very well	7	4	1	3	1
Don't know; haven't heard	1	1	4	1	2

Survey question: "How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven't you heard enough to say: creating jobs?" (percentage of respondents)

Response	Burundi (2014/2015)	Kenya (2014/2015)	Madagascar (2011/2013)	Uganda (2011/2013)	United Rep. of Tanzania (2014/2015)
Very badly	40	42	30	51	23
Fairly badly	34	31	57	27	38
Fairly well	16	22	7	16	33
Very well	7	4	0	2	2
Don't know; haven't heard	4	1	6	4	4

Survey question: "How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven't you heard enough to say: narrowing gaps between rich and poor?" (percentage of respondents)

Response	Burundi (2014/2015)	Kenya (2014/2015)	Madagascar (2011/2013)	Uganda (2011/2013)	United Rep. of Tanzania (2014/2015)
Very badly	54	52	34	56	32
Fairly badly	27	30	53	26	40
Fairly well	11	14	6	11	24
Very well	6	3	0	3	2
Don't know; haven't heard	2	2	7	4	2

Source: Afrobarometer (2015).

Kenya, children that attend private schools receive the equivalent of two months of extra teaching per year compared to those who attend public schools (Society for International Development, 2013).

Poor governance creates weak social cohesion, which then incentivizes further poor governance.

Factors outside of school, such as early-life nutrition, also have an important bearing on the extent to which education contributes to cohesiveness in society. Children who are malnourished find it more difficult to concentrate at school and their long-term education outcomes are notably deficient compared to their counterparts (WHO, 2013). Of the countries that undertake Demographic and Household Surveys, all of them have rates of stunting that are 30 per cent or higher (see figure 12). In Burundi and Madagascar, 50 per cent or more of children are malnourished. This represents a significant challenge in the short and long term for building human capital and using education to develop inclusive societies.

An important institution for demanding improved service delivery from governments, particularly in the area of education, is civil society. In fact, facilitating and encouraging the participation of civil society in political affairs, or “giving voice to dissenting voices,” is central to governance systems that are more likely to result in socially cohesive outcomes (OECD, 2011, p. 24). Similarly, it seems fair to assume that there is a higher risk of civil unrest in countries where the demand for democratic participation far outweighs the supply of that participation.

At the same time, decentralization of government services and decisions, including fiscal decentralization in particular, can be used as a tool for strengthening social cohesion. Local government institutions tend to have more information about the needs and wishes of their constituencies, which, if exploited, can result in improved allocation of public resources and outcomes that are more conducive to cohesion

(OECD, 2011). Policies to achieve this objective are not always successful, however, due to a number of design and implementation failures, such as capture by local elites and inadequate capacity at local government levels (Robinson, 2007).

In Kenya, the decentralization of its health management system, for example, has been pursued with the objective of improving the provision and coordination of health services at the district level. However, it was initially hampered by a lack of funds and accessibility constraints particularly in those districts that were most in need of effective health services (Ndavi and others, 2009). Ensuring that governance institutions are inclusive and offer meaningful participation for all regions is an important requirement for achieving cohesion at a national level.

A common problem that undermines governance in the region is corruption. Corruption also tends to erode trust in institutions, a key component of social cohesion. As noted by Justesen and Bjørnskov (2012), corruption can also have a disproportionate impact upon the poor.⁵⁰


Inclusive education systems facilitate social mobility, reduce the likelihood that generations are left behind and enable greater civic participation in governance.

Corruption is a problem in many countries in Eastern Africa. Eritrea, Somalia and South Sudan have some of the highest perceived corruption levels on the planet, according to Transparency International’s 2013 Corruption Perception Index.⁵¹

⁵⁰ Justesen and Bjørnskov (2012) examine the relationship between poverty and corruption using a model to suggest that poor people are more likely to be victims of corrupt behaviour by street-level government bureaucrats. Poor people often rely heavily on services provided by Governments and are, therefore, more likely to be met by demands for bribes in return for obtaining those services. In a survey of 18 different countries in sub-Saharan Africa, they conclude that the poor will be more likely to pay bribes, and corruption comes to work as a regressive tax that hits people who are disadvantaged.

⁵¹ The Corruption Perception Index is annual index compiled by Transparency International. It is based on a combination of surveys and assessments of corruption. The most recent index (2013)

Figure 12: Proportion of children under five who are classified as malnourished (Percentage of children with height-for-age below -2 SD)



Source: *Demographic and Health Survey (2015).*

Nonetheless, there are also some promising results for the region, with countries such as Rwanda and Seychelles now reporting that 53 per cent and 54 per cent of their population enjoy daily lives with limited corruption, particularly in the administration and delivery of basic services (Transparency International, 2014).

To briefly summarize, the region faces a number of governance challenges. Taken together, these present a major obstacle to building cohesive

erosion of trust in institutions and low levels of satisfaction with service delivery. This finding is consistent with international comparators. For example, three of the six countries in Africa with the weakest governance are found in Eastern Africa, according to the latest Ibrahim Index of African Governance.⁵² Ongoing investment in improving governance and service delivery in Eastern Africa is, therefore, a priority for strengthening social cohesion.

societies for a number of reasons, including the included 177 countries. More detail is available from <http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/>.

⁵² These countries are the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eritrea and Somalia. The methodology and data sources of the Ibrahim Index of African Governance are described in more detail above.

Part Three

Conclusions

This assessment of the state of social cohesion across Eastern Africa presents a mixed picture. On the one hand, notable progress has been made across the region over the past decade in terms of improving human development, particularly with respect to both educational and health outcomes. On the other hand, this report reveals a set of major social challenges and tensions, which still need to be overcome. The political conflict which ignited in Burundi in April 2015 is an unfortunate testimony to the fact that situations of apparent social stability can degenerate quickly into conflict and have regional repercussions. As a consequence, dealing effectively with the issues that impinge negatively on social cohesion needs to be a priority.

A number of pertinent lessons can be drawn from the – admittedly selective – social audit contained in this report. First, despite the impressive rate of economic growth achieved over the past 10 to 15 years, widespread poverty remains a major challenge. Moreover, opinion polls carried out across the region have demonstrated that citizens do not always share the perception that improved economic performance has led to improvement in their state of well-being. Governments need to find new ways to improve equity while simultaneously sustaining high growth. This will involve tackling inequality and inequity in all its dimensions – gender, territorial, ethnic, etc.

Second, there is a lot of value to be gleaned from carrying out more qualitative evaluations of human development. Even with their well-known limitations, frequent opinion polls and surveys of the public mood can be very useful tools to inform government policy. Yet it is a source of information that is currently underexploited in the region. The only organizations to regularly conduct such opinion polls in the region are the United States-based firm Gallup and Afrobarometer. Exploring ways of enlarging the scope and regularity of such

polls would provide insights into better gauging of public opinion on numerous issues that affect social cohesion.

Third, greater efforts are required to monitor progress towards achieving social development goals at regional, national and subnational levels, particularly as the international community strives towards the achievement of the more ambitious set of Sustainable Development Goals. The forthcoming African Social Development Index by ECA, which is being piloted in a number of countries across the region, is specifically designed to help identify areas of both progress and where Governments need to dedicate more resources and attention at the national and subnational levels. The full collaboration of member States in the elaboration of tools like this is key to their successful adoption and implementation.

There would be a lot of value in carrying out more qualitative evaluations of human development. Frequent opinion polls and surveys of the public mood, even with their limitations, can be useful tools to inform government policy.

Fourth, this report's review of the state of social cohesion in the region draws attention to a number of locally developed tools for fostering cohesion and addressing tension. In several instances, these tools – often built on traditional forms of governance – have proven to be highly successful and innovative. To be sure, bodies based on institutions from outside the region – such as the ombudsman – can play a positive role in building social cohesion. But this should not preclude the development of local solutions, which should be

Because of the trans-frontier nature of many social problems, increasingly, the challenges need to be tackled at the regional level.

further enhanced and utilized to accelerate progress in strengthening social cohesion.

Fifth, this report reveals that a lot of insightful and pertinent information and data is available on the state of social cohesion in Eastern Africa. Yet it is scattered – and not all the sources are always well-known. Perhaps under the aegis of a regional body, such as the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) or EAC, there would be much value in establishing a regular report bringing together all the relevant data and tracking progress towards greater social cohesion.

Sixth, because of the trans-frontier nature of many social problems, increasingly, the challenges need to be tackled at the regional level. A lack of social cohesion can rapidly endanger regional stability. Yet the focus of most regional integration programmes in Eastern Africa has been the advancement of physical and economic integration, with trade and market access high in the priority list.

Regional leaders and organizations should employ mechanisms under regional frameworks to address social challenges⁵³ and strengthen social cohesion. It is relevant that three of the four bottom countries listed in the Fragile States Report 2015 are located in Eastern Africa. Overcoming the lack of social cohesion in such countries is a daunting task – and they cannot do it alone. Countries in such situations require the constructive engagement of their neighbours. Consequently, existing regional organizations and mechanisms should be supported to strengthen peace and social stability in the region. One example of this is the Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN) of

⁵³ Deacon, and others (2007) forcefully argue that, as the economic sphere becomes increasingly globalized, national social policies alone will no longer be able to cope with many social challenges. Thus, for some of the challenges pertinent to social cohesion, regional social policies may be the most appropriate response.

IGAD, which sets a good precedent, but deserves strengthening.

This final point merits some further discussion. Regional solutions to the problems associated with a lack of social cohesion will be constrained by the availability of resources at the regional level. Presently, for instance, the annual budget of the EAC Secretariat, at around \$140 million, is miniscule compared to the scale of challenges and the size of the regional economy (approximately \$134 billion in 2014). Thus far, despite all the good work, it is probably fair to say that regional organizations such as the EAC do not impact directly enough on the lives of their citizens. At least, that seems to be people's perceptions at present. A recent opinion poll carried out by Afrobarometer (2015) revealed that less than one in five of the citizens in Burundi, Kenya or the United Republic of Tanzania enthusiastically felt that the regional body was having a positive impact on their lives.

The annual budget of the EAC Secretariat, at around \$140 million, is miniscule compared to the scale of challenges and the size of the regional economy.

To be successful, regional integration requires the building of common identities and it needs people also to feel the benefits deriving from the regional project – people will respond better if they attribute directly the benefits of regional integration to regional organizations. In this context, Mold and Eyakuze (2014) argue in favour of establishing a “regional solidarity fund” within the EAC to tackle social inequities head-on.⁵⁴ Funds

⁵⁴ There are precedents for establishing such a fund in Eastern Africa. That was exactly what was implemented in the early stages of European integration. Since the mid-1970s, the poorer regions of the European Union have benefited from additional financing to address their unique set of challenges. The European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) was created in 1975 specifically to deal with the challenges of enlargement, and introduced the notion of “redistribution” between richer and poorer regions of the Union. Many of the infrastructure projects in the “peripheral” regions of Europe (e.g. Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Southern Italy) were paid for by European funds. These projects made a great impact in terms of facilitating the faster growth and development (“convergence” in the

Mold and Eyakuze (2014) argue in favour of establishing a “regional solidarity fund” within the EAC to tackle social inequities head-on.

could be disbursed on the basis of subregional necessities – for instance, the building of schools, health centres or construction of roads and power-generating schemes in the poorer areas across the EAC. Regional solidarity and cohesion would thus be enhanced – and people in the more deprived parts of the region would increasingly recognize the direct role of the regional body in improving their living conditions. “Financed by the EAC Regional Cohesion Fund” would be a powerful rallying call in the poorest parts of the EAC.⁵⁵ Such policy proposals may be equally valid for other parts of Eastern Africa.

Ultimately, however, the achievement and sustenance of greater social cohesion requires timely and enduring commitment and policy action at all levels. Over the past decade and a half, Eastern Africa has emphatically demonstrated that it is capable of achieving great things in terms of improving some dimensions of social cohesion. It now needs to expand that progress to other areas and move forward to create a more cohesive and prosperous future.

parlance of economists) of hitherto remote and neglected regions of Europe. Even now, three or four decades after these countries joined the European Union, regional funds represent around one third of the total budget of the Union – and that share is still rising.

⁵⁵ Clearly, there are many organizational details that would need to be discussed in depth – including how such a fund would be established, under what authority it would be placed, and what would be the disbursement rules. The starting point is that policymakers across the region reach a broad consensus on the importance of mitigating regional inequities. That way, a stronger, more resilient regional community could emerge (see Mold and Eyakuze, 2014).

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